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1 Introduction 
Over the last fifteen years, the connection between free trade and the envi-
ronment has been the subject of considerable debate. The debate has been  
fuelled by the negotiations over the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
e.g. Bhagwati & Daly (1993), and has become more intense with the comple-
tion of the Uruguay Round of GATT and the subsequent formation of the 
WTO, e.g. Copeland & Taylor (2004). More recently, the debate has been fu-
elled by plans of further enlargement of the EU towards the Balkans and 
Turkey, where environmental standards are arguably less rigours than in 
West Europe. In addition to the usual proposition that freer trade acceler-
ates environmental degradation through more consumption, environmental-
ists have proposed that freer trade may harm the environment through less 
strict regulation if national governments use environmental policy as a sub-
stitute for trade policy. 
This proposition represents one strand within the more general issue of en-
vironmental federalism - the division of responsibility for environmental 
management between different levels of government. Whether environ-
mental standards are better set at the federal or national level is still an 
unresolved public policy question. In the EU, for example, the principle of 
subsidiarity calls for national standards, whereas harmonisation of national 
regulations calls for federal standards. 
Our objective is to assess the environmentalists’ fear that national govern-
ments might compete by undercutting each others’ environmental standards 
in a federal economy consisting of countries that may differ in size and other 
characteristics. We assume that trade policy is banned, but that the respon-
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sibility for environmental policies is for the most part still in the hands of 
national governments, reflecting the present-day situation in the EU. Con-
sequently, an environmental instrument may take on the role of e.g. a tariff 
in addition to performing its original role, which is to internalise the social 
costs associated with pollution. 
We analyse the incentives for member states to undercut each others’ envi-
ronmental standards in two market forms: perfect competition and monopo-
listic competition. The former is chosen, even if inappropriate, because it 
serves as a point of reference. The latter is chosen for its relevance. A sig-
nificant part of world trade takes place in imperfectly competitive markets. 
Thus, assuming that producers have no market power is often inappropri-
ate. We assume free movement of capital and goods. Goods may or may not 
incur transport costs. Workers, on the other hand, are assumed perfectly 
immobile. This reflects the fact that capital is internationally more mobile 
than labour.  
Whereas most previous work assumes that pollution generated in one coun-
try doesn’t spill over into another, our analysis allows for pollution spill-
overs between states. We use a single parameter to capture the extent to 
which pollution is transboundary. This allows us to explore a continuum of 
cases, from purely domestic pollution to perfectly transboundary pollution. 
To keep the analytical complexity on a manageable level, we assume that 
pollution is a public bad both intranationally and internationally, if pollu-
tion spillovers should occur, in the sense that one individual’s exposure to 
pollution doesn’t reduce the amount of pollution available to others. We note 
that this characterisation may be appropriate for greenhouse gases and 
global warming, but not for acid rains caused by high levels of sulphur diox-
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ide. With pollution spillovers, three distinct types of externalities may arise 
in our federal economy: non-transboundary pollution externalities, trans-
boundary pollution externalities and transboundary trade-related external-
ities. An example of the third is higher prices in one country because of 
tighter environmental regulation in another country. 
As a benchmark for the member states’ non-cooperative choice of environ-
mental standards, we use that of the federal government. The federal gov-
ernment is understood as benevolent planner that maximises the welfare of 
its constituents. We assume that the federal government can choose differ-
ent standards for each country. Thus, ex ante, there is no requirement of pol-
icy harmonisation. We return to this issue in the conclusions section in our 
discussion of asymmetric countries. As a matter of terminology, we say that 
environmental standards are federally efficient if they coincide with those 
chosen by the federal government. 
An alternative benchmark is the level of environmental protection that 
equates marginal damage costs with marginal abatement costs, proposed by 
the British welfare economist Pigou (1920). However, when pollution is not 
the only market failure, Pigouvian policies may be suboptimal from a fed-
eral perspective. As Baumol & Oates (1988) show, the efficiency of a Pigou-
vian tax or an equivalent emission permit system relies on the assumption 
of perfect competition. For Pigouvian taxes to be efficient, the deadweight 
loss due to imperfect competition should be included in either damage costs 
or abatement costs. This is not standard in Pigouvian marginal analysis, 
and that is why we choose not to use it as a benchmark. Transboundary pol-
lution, on the other hand, does not affect the efficiency of Pigouvian policies 
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because, by definition, marginal damage costs include the costs borne by 
both domestic and foreign residents. 
Following Rauscher (1994), we use the term ecological dumping to describe 
a situation where national governments choose less strict environmental 
standards than the federal government. The term not-in-my-back-yard is 
used to describe the opposite case. Using the former definition, our research 
question can be written as: are there theoretical grounds for the fears of en-
vironmental dumping? In this context, dumping refers to producers obtain-
ing hidden subsidies in the form of less strict pollution abatement require-
ments, which allows them to dump their products in international markets 
at prices that do not reflect the true cost of production. In contrast to normal 
dumping, ecological dumping is an activity performed by governments, not 
by firms. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In Section 2 we review previous 
work. We find that even though incentives may arise for national govern-
ments to depart from the cooperative policy, a priori, there is nothing to 
suggest that all countries set less strict environmental standards than the 
federal government. Depending on the strategy variables and other aspects 
of the game, some may set more strict standards. The few papers that allow 
for transboundary pollution find that pollution spillovers work in favour of 
ecological dumping, and that the occurrence of ecological dumping is certain 
if pollution is perfectly transboundary. 
 
In Section 3 we analyse the non-cooperative choice of emission standards in 
a asymmetric n-country model with firms that are perfectly competitive. 
Our analysis relies on the model presented by Oates & Schwab (1988), but 
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allows for pollution to spill from one country into another. We find that non-
cooperative emission standards are federally efficient as long as pollution is 
purely domestic. The non-cooperative choice coincides with the cooperative 
choice because there are no transboundary externalities, neither trade-
related nor pollution-related. We contribute to the original article by show-
ing that environmental dumping occurs if pollution is not purely domestic. 
 
In Section 4 we analyse the non-cooperative choice of emission taxes in a 
symmetric two-country model with firms that are monopolistically competi-
tive firms. Our analysis relies on a general equilibrium framework à la 
Dixit-Stiglitz. Whereas the original model presented by Pflüger (2001) as-
sumes that pollution is non-transboundary, we allow for varying degrees of 
transboundary pollution. We contribute in two ways to the original article. 
First, whereas Pflüger is not, without assigning values to the model’s pa-
rameters, able to tell if the non-cooperative tax rates are higher or lower 
than the cooperative tax rates, we are able to show that ecological dumping 
occurs if pollution is perfectly transboundary. However, if pollution is only 
partially transboundary, not-in-my-back-yard might occur as well. Intui-
tively, this is because of the existence of both positive, trade-related, and 
negative, pollution-related, transboundary externalities. Second, by elimi-
nating the monopolistically competitive firms’ market power, we obtain per-
fect competition and the standard results associated with it, as a special 
case of monopolistic competition. 
Section 5 concludes by summarising the main results, discussing policy im-
plications and by suggesting topics for future research. We propose that the 
choice of environmental standards should be coordinated if firms are less 
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than perfectly competitive or if pollution is transboundary. However, if co-
ordination means, for practical reasons, harmonisation, coordination of en-
vironmental policy may be undesirable even if national governments, with-
out coordination, may use it as a substitute for trade policy. 
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2 A survey of previous studies 
In this section we discuss previous work that has studied the incentives for 
national governments to depart from the cooperative choice of environ-
mental standards. The literature can be categorised either according to the 
degree of competition between firms or the degree of capital mobility. Dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s, the focus of research has moved along both these 
dimensions, from perfectly towards imperfectly competitive economies and 
internationally immobile to internationally mobile capital. 
We choose to categorise the literature according to the degree of competition 
because our primary interest is in economies with free movement of capital. 
Nonetheless, we keep the issue of capital mobility at the forefront of the dis-
cussion because it determines the nature of the game that national govern-
ments play against each other. If capital is immobile, the governments com-
pete for market share, whereas if it’s mobile, the governments compete for 
firms. In the market-share game environmental policies are set after firms 
decide where to locate. In the location game policies are set before firms de-
cide where to locate.  
An implicit assumption in the location game is that national governments 
are able to commit to an environmental policy. Without commitment, after a 
firm has located, and location costs are sunk, the government of the host 
country might tighten its regulations well above those in neighbouring 
countries, without inducing the firm to relocate. A rational firm will foresee 
this possibility at the time of the location, why pre-location taxes are of lim-
ited significance if governments cannot commit. 
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2.1 Perfect product market competition 
It is well established that when the polluting firms are perfectly competitive 
and emissions generated by production are non-transboundary, there is no 
reason to expect the government of a small country to depart from the coop-
erative choice of environmental standards, see e.g. Rauscher (1994) or Ulph 
(1997). If trade policy is not banned, this result holds regardless of whether 
the countries are large or small, that is, whether they can influence world 
prices or not, using the terminology by Ulph (1997, p. 207). 
However, if trade policy is banned, the government of a large country may 
use environmental policy to improve its terms of trade. It follows from the 
optimal tariff theory, introduced by the English economist Charles Bicker-
dike (1906), that a country that is a net exporter has an incentive to tighten 
its environmental standards as a proxy for the optimal export tax, whereas 
a country that is a net importer has an incentive to relax its environmental 
standards in order to encourage domestic production and so reduce its de-
mand for imports and hence the price it pays for imports.  
The government of a small country, however, has no incentive to depart 
from the cooperative equilibrium, neither when capital is internationally 
immobile nor when it is mobile. When capital is immobile, the government 
has no incentive to depart from the Pigouvian choice of environmental stan-
dards, which in the case of perfect competition are federally efficient as 
Baumol & Oates (1988) show, because by assumption it cannot influence the 
country’s terms of trade, and failure to internalise environmental external-
ities is welfare reducing. Nor can the government of a small country in-
crease the welfare of its residents by relaxing environmental standards 
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when capital is mobile because the additional pollution outweighs the bene-
fits from additional capital, as Oates & Schwab (1988) show. 
The paper by Oates & Schwab (1988), henceforth O&S, is regarded as one of 
the most important contributions within the strand of literature that as-
sumes perfect competition. Within a neoclassical framework, O&S show that 
without coordination, national governments follow the Pigouvian rule in pol-
icy design, and that the decentralised outcome that emerges is efficient from 
a federal perspective. The behaviour of national governments promote effi-
ciency in O&S’s model because there are no transboundary externalities, 
neither trade-related nor pollution-related, using the categorisation that we 
established in the introductory section. Because the rate of return on capital 
is fixed, the only economic rents in O&S are those earned by the immobile 
workforce of each country. Because workers are internationally immobile 
the rents remain domestic.  
The analysis by O&S is noteworthy also because, in contrast to the models 
with imperfect competition that we review in the remainder of this section, 
it allows for asymmetry between countries. In fact, the only assumption 
O&S do, in addition to assuming perfect competition and that preferences 
and technologies exhibit the usual neoclassical properties, is that workers 
are homogeneous within, but not necessarily across, countries.  
2.2 Imperfect product market competition 
While perfect competition may be plausible description of some markets, 
many manufactured goods exhibit significant economies of scale in produc-
tion, so that imperfect competition may be a better characterisation of their 
market structure. As we shall see, when producers have market power and 
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governments act strategically, the conclusion by O&S that there is no need 
for policy coordination may no longer hold. However, in general, it cannot be 
assumed that national governments engage in environmental dumping 
when firms are less than perfectly competitive. Not-in-my-back-yard is 
equally possible. 
In 1980s a substantial body of literature explored the implications of imper-
fectly competitive international markets for trade policy. During the 1990s 
and 2000s this literature has been adapted to explore the implications for 
environmental policy, especially in regimes where trade policy is prohibited. 
The early models draw on oligopoly models in the tradition of Brander & 
Krugman (1983) and Brander & Spencer (1985) and assume that firms are 
immobile. We start with taking a brief look at them. Next, we review some 
of the more recent oligopoly models with mobile capital. Finally, we take a 
look at models that assume monopolistic competition between producers. 
2.2.1 Oligopoly with immobile firms 
Barrett introduced the concept of strategic trade policy into the field of envi-
ronmental policy in his 1994 article, where he shows that if national gov-
ernments cannot use trade instruments to shift profits toward domestic pro-
ducers, they may use weak environmental standards instead. Barrett’s 
model is a variant of the model presented by Brander & Spencer (1985).  
Brander & Spencer (1985) study a Cournot duopoly with one domestic and 
one foreign firm that produce identical products, all of which are exported to 
a third country. In contrast to O&S, Brander & Spencer assume that both 
firms are immobile. Against the grain of the optimal tariff theory, Brander 
& Spencer show that national governments may be tempted to use export 
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subsidies to give the domestic producer a cost advantage that will allow it to 
capture a larger share of the international market and earn larger profits. 
The terms of trade move against the subsiding country, but its welfare can 
increase because, with imperfect competition, price exceeds the marginal 
costs of exports.  
Barrett’s (1994) analysis shows that in regimes where trade policy is out-
lawed and competition is Cournot, environmental dumping occurs. However, 
if firms compete in prices rather than quantities, the incentive to weaken 
standards is reversed, and not-in-my-back-yard occurs. 
Following Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1994) shows that the distortion in envi-
ronmental policies can be decomposed into a profit-capture effect and a pol-
lution-shifting effect. The profit-capture effect relaxes policies as each coun-
try attempts to gain a competitive advantage over its rival and capture 
foreign profits. The pollution-shifting effect tightens policies as each country 
attempts to transfer production and the pollution associated with it to the 
other country. The pollution-shifting effect vanishes if pollution is perfectly 
transboundary because shifted pollution causes as much damage to the do-
mestic environment as domestic pollution. As Barrett (1994), Kennedy finds 
that the net effect is policy relaxing, i.e. environmental dumping occurs, ex-
cept in the special case of perfect competition with no transboundary pollu-
tion, i.e. that of O&S. In this special case, Kennedy shows that the Nash 
equilibrium is efficient.  
2.2.2 Oligopoly with mobile firms 
In the models reviewed in the previous subsection, the location of production 
was fixed, so while strict environmental policies might reduce the market 
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shares of domestic producers, it would require significant asymmetries in 
policies to shut down domestic production altogether since that would re-
quire driving firms’ profits to zero. Prima facie, it would seem that allowing 
firms to relocate their production would increase the pressure on national 
governments to lower their environmental standards. However, as Ulph & 
Valentini (2001) shows, the opposite may be true when firms play Cournot 
against each other. Contrary to popular beliefs, Ulph & Valentini find that 
the extent of environmental dumping may be larger in the market-share 
game than in the location game when firms play Cournot and all profits ac-
crue to the host country. Greaker (2003) reports similar results. 
The strategic choice of emission taxes with internationally mobile polluting 
firms is studied in the strand of literature originating with Markusen, 
Morey & Olewiler (1995), henceforth MMO. The consensus within this 
strand of literature is that strategically chosen emission taxes may be ex-
cessively low or high. However, the determining factor is not whether firms 
play Cournot or Stackelberg as in the models with immobile firms discussed 
in the previous subsection, but the disutility of pollution. If the disutility of 
pollution is large enough, national governments may bid up each other’s 
emission taxes until the producers are driven out of business. This can hap-
pen even if production would be desirable from a federal perspective. For 
example, no one wants a long-term storage site for radioactive waste in their 
backyard, but we are collectively better of with one, than without one. Thus, 
with appropriate transfers in place, building a plant in one country could 
constitute a Pareto improvement. 
In the spirit of Brander & Spencer (1985), MMO assume a two-country 
economy with one imperfectly competitive firm that has increasing returns 
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to scale at the plant level. Following O&S, MMO assume that pollution is 
created as a by-product of output and that it doesn’t cross national bounda-
ries. In contrast to O&S, where capital is treated as a continuous variable, 
in MMO capital is treated as a discrete variable. The firm either decides to 
build a plant or it doesn’t. There is nothing in between.  
Because of non-zero transport costs, the firm has to weigh the high fixed-
cost option of having plants in both countries against the high variable-cost 
option of serving both markets from a single plant. Thus, the firm has to de-
cide whether to build two plants, one plant or not to produce at all.  
An unfortunate consequence of the discrete-choice aspects of the firm’s prob-
lem is the analytical complexity. In particular, the traditional reaction-curve 
analysis, used by e.g. Barrett (1994) to derive a Nash equilibrium in the 
market-share game, is of little use in MMO’s model because there are large 
discontinuities in the tax reaction curves as the firm changes the number or 
the location of its plants. Because the model is analytically unsolvable, 
MMO rely on numerical examples to illustrate the welfare losses from non-
cooperative behaviour. For obvious reasons, MMO do not even attempt to 
provide an exhaustive characterisation of all possible equilibria. 
MMO’s model can be criticised on two accounts. First, it assumes that the 
firm is owned by individuals living outside the federal economy. Thus, the 
economic rent due to the one-firm restriction is not included in the welfare 
calculations.2 MMO’s assumption of external owners might be plausible for 
                                            
 
2 The only way for the host country to retain these monopoly rents is by taxing emission. 
Thus, the emission tax serves two purposes: to raise revenue from the monopolist and to 
reduce pollution. Competing to attract plants, the countries might bid down the share of the 
monopolist’s profits they retain. 
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a group of developing countries but not for the EU or the United States. Sec-
ond, MMO compares their non-cooperative tax rates with tax rates that 
each country would set without coordination if the firm was immobile. If the 
objective is to study the efficiency of non-cooperative taxes, as it obviously is 
in MMO, non-strategic Pigouvian tax rates, as MMO call them, are the 
wrong benchmark because they do not necessarily maximise joint welfare.  
To avoid the analytical complexity in MMO, subsequent papers have made 
additional restricting assumptions, especially regarding transports costs, as 
illustrated in Table 1. Assuming zero transport costs simplifies the analysis 
because it rules out the possibility that the firm builds more than one plant. 
Table 1: Literature on strategic environmental policy with one or more oligopolistic 
firms that are internationally mobile3 
Author(s) Coun-
tries 
Firms Transport
costs 
Profits accrue 
toa 
Transbound-
ary pollution 
Policy in-
strument 
Equilibrium 
concept 
MMO 
(1995) 
2 1 yes owners outside 
the federal 
economy 
no  emission 
 tax 
general 
Rauscher 
(1995) 
many 1 no owners outside 
the federal 
economy 
varying  
degrees 
emission 
 tax 
partial 
Hoel (1997) 2 1 / en-
doge-
nous 
no owners in each 
country 
no emission 
 tax 
partial 
Levinson 
(1997) 
2 1 yes host country no emission 
 tax 
general 
Ulph & 
Valentini 
(2001) 
2 2b no host country no emission 
 standard 
partial 
                                            
 
3 The earlier paper by Markusen, Morey and Olewiler (1993), partly incomplete as the au-
thors themselves admit, as well as the paper by Motta and Thisse (1994) that relies on it, 
are omitted from this survey because they assume that one country’s emission tax is en-
dogenous while other’s tax is exogenous. 
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Author(s) Coun-
tries 
Firms Transport
costs 
Profits accrue 
toa 
Transbound-
ary pollution 
Policy in-
strument 
Equilibrium 
concept 
Dijkstra 
(2003) 
2 1 no owners in each 
country 
no output 
constraint 
partial 
Greaker 
(2003)c 
2 2 no owners in each 
country 
no emission 
 standard 
partial 
a Whereas MMO assume that all profits accrue to owners that live outside the federal 
economy, Hoel (1997) assumes, more generally, that half of the owners, or less, live in each 
country. The rest live outside the federal economy. Dijkstra (2003) assumes that some own-
ers live in one country and the rest in the other. Greaker (2003) assumes that the owners of 
firm A live in one country and the owners of firm B in the other. 
b Ulph & Valentini (2001) assume that there are two firms instead of one and that these 
firms play Cournot against each other. 
c Whereas the other models assume that the firm(s) have no historical location, Greaker 
(2003) assumes that intially, both firms are established in their respective home countries, 
and thus may have to write off sunk costs if the decide to relocate. 
The ownership problem is also prevalent in Rauscher (1995). Hoel (1997), in 
contrast, carries out a full analysis of the ownership issue. Hoel’s paper is 
also noteworthy because it is able to characterise the conditions in which 
ecological dumping and not-in-my-back-yard, respectively, occur without 
having to rely on numerical methods as MMO. In the following we sketch 
the main results of Hoel (1997).  
For the country that doesn’t host the firm, welfare is given by consumer 
surplus plus the country’s share of the firm’s monopoly profits. We denote 
the non-host country’s welfare by ( )1,0W ψ , where 1ψ  is its host country’s 
tax rate, and 0 the number of plants in the non-host country. 
( )1 1,0 / 0W ψ ψ∂ ∂ <  is decreasing in 1ψ  because both consumer surplus and 
monopoly profits are decreasing in 1ψ  (Hoel 1997, pp. 244-245). The welfare 
of the host country is given by the sum of (1) consumer surplus, (2) the coun-
try’s share of profits, (3) emission tax revenue and (4) environmental dam-
age costs. We denote the host country’s welfare by ( )1,1W ψ , where 1 is the 
number of plants in the host country. 
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Denoting the surplus that a country receives from hosting the plant, i.e. the 
sum of (3) and (4), by ( )1Z Z ψ= , we can write ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1,1 ,0W W Zψ ψ ψ= + . 
Hoel (1997, p. 246) assumes that the plant damages the environment of the 
host country even it doesn’t produce anything. Thus, ( )0 0Z < . For small 
values of 1ψ , ( )1 1/ 0Z ψ ψ∂ ∂ >   because tax revenue increases and environ-
mental damages are reduced as the tax rate increases. However, due to the 
Laffer effect, named after the American economist Arthur B. Laffer, 
( )1 1/ 0Z ψ ψ∂ ∂ <  for large values of  1ψ  as tax revenue starts to drop. Thus, 
starting from 1 0ψ = , Z is negative and grows as 1ψ  grows. Z may or may 
not become positive as 1ψ  grows. For large values of 1ψ , Z  starts to decline 
as the economy moves along the downward sloping part of the Laffer curve.  
Following MMO, Hoel considers a game where the national governments 
first choose their tax rates, after which the firm locates in the country with 
the lower tax rate.4 If the tax rates are equal the firm is indifferent where to 
locate. Exitψ is the highest tax rate that is consistent with non-negative 
profit. Thus, if both countries set tax rates higher than Exitψ  the firm will 
exit the market. Thus, Exitψ  acts as a upper limit on the tax rates we need to 
consider. Depending on the level of environmental damage costs, Hoel’s 
game has three possible outcomes, as we illustrate in Figure 1 on the follow-
ing page.  
                                            
 
4  In a related  paper, Hoel (Hoel 1994) shows that the results do not change if other envi-
ronmental policy instruments are used instead of or in addition to emission taxes. 
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In case (a), ( )1,1W ψ  reaches its maximum at a value of 1ψ  for which 
( ) ( )1 1,1 ,0W Wψ ψ> , i.e. at a value for which Z is positive. The non-
cooperative equilibrium is for both countries to set the same tax rate for 
which 0Z = . As long as ( ) ( )1 1,1 ,0W Wψ ψ>  it will pay the country without 
the plant to undercut the country with the plant. On other hand, if 
( ) ( )1 1,1 ,0W Wψ ψ<  it would pay the country with the plant to raise its tax in 
order to lose the plant. So the only stable equilibrium is where 
( ) ( )1 1,0 ,1W Wψ ψ= . The cooperative tax rate, Coopψ , maximises 
( ) ( )1 1,0 ,1W Wψ ψ+ . Only by coincidence would 0,1 Coopψ ψ= . Generally, we 
get either 0,1 Coopψ ψ<  or  0,1 Coopψ ψ> , i.e. environmental-dumping or not-in-
my-back-yard. 
In case (b), ( )1,1W ψ  reaches its maximum at a value of 1ψ  for which 
( ) ( )1 1,1 ,0W Wψ ψ< , i.e. at a value for which Z is negative. The Nash equilib-
rium is for one country to set its tax equal to the value that maximises 
( )1,1W ψ  and host the plant, and for the other country to set a tax at least as 
great as 0ψ , where 0ψ  is defined by ( ) ( )0 1,0 ,1W Wψ ψ= . The country with 
the plant is worse off than the country without it. However, given that the 
country without the plant has set a tax at least as great as 0ψ , the country 
with the plant cannot do better than to choose the tax rate that maximises 
( )1,1W ψ . Here, 1 0Coopψ ψ ψ< < , because ( ) ( )1 1 1 1,0 / ,1 / 0W Wψ ψ ψ ψ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ < . 
Thus, the governments engage in a competition of not-in-my-back-yard. The 
reason why the non-cooperative taxes are less strict than cooperative is that 
host country ignores the consumer surplus of the other country, and the 
other country’s share of the firm’s profits, which are both decreasing in 1ψ . 
In case (c) the environmental damage costs are so large that ( )1,1 0W ψ <  for 
all 1 Exitψ ψ< . The Nash equilibrium is for the countries bid up each other’s 
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tax rates until the firm exists the market. As long as ( ) ( )1 1,0 ,1 0W Wψ ψ+ >  
for some value of 1 Exitψ ψ< , collectively, the countries would be better off 
with production in one of the countries than without no production at all. 
With appropriate transfers, both countries could be made better off. 
Based on these three scenarios, it is clear that even in the simplest models 
of mobile firms it cannot be assumed that national governments will engage 
in environmental dumping to attract firms. This conclusion remains true if 
the simple model by Hoel (1997) is extended, by increasing the number of 
countries (Rauscher 1995), by increasing the number of firms (Greaker 
2003, Hoel 1997, Ulph, Valentini 2001), or by introducing transport costs 
(Levinson 1997, Markusen, Morey & Olewiler 1995), so that firms may find 
it profitable to build more than one plant. Nor is the conclusion dependent 
on the type of policy instrument or on who appropriates the firm(s)’ profits, 
even if non-zero profits might reinforce the incentive for national govern-
ments to bid down each other’s environmental standards in models where 
profits accrue to the host country.  
However, there is one exception. Rauscher (1995) finds that the opportunity 
cost, in terms of environmental damages, of undercutting foreign emission 
tax rates becomes infinitesimally small if pollution is perfectly transbound-
ary. In this case, the Nash equilibrium is for all countries not to tax emis-
sions at all.  
2.2.3 Monopolistic product market competition 
Pflüger (2001), studies the non-cooperative choice of environmental policies 
in an extension of Dixit & Stiglitz’s (1977) model of monopolistic competition 
between a large but finite number of symmetric firms that produce differen-
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tiated goods. A central assumption in the Dixit-Stiglitz model is that elastic-
ity of substitution, as defined by Hicks (1932), between different varieties is 
constant. This produces the nice properties that the price elasticity of de-
mand for any variety is approximately equal to the elasticity of substitution 
and that producers set prices as constant mark-ups on marginal costs. 
In a federation of two symmetric states, Pflüger shows that the choice of 
emission tax by one country imposes a number externalities on the other. 
These externalities are partly positive and partly negative, opening up the 
possibilities of both ecological dumping and not-in-my-back-yard. Pflüger’s 
analysis shows that environmental dumping (not-in-my-back-yard) occurs if 
the importance of emissions is small (large) relative to transport costs and 
the mark-up on average variable costs. By assuming non-zero transport 
costs Pflüger introduces the home-market effect, observed by Krugman 
(1980), into his model. According to the home-market effect, consumer prices 
can be lowered, and welfare increased, if the location of production is shifted 
towards the home market. Prices fall because home-produced varieties do 
not incur transport costs, as do imported ones.  
Pflüger’s result relies on the standard assumption that national govern-
ments have only one policy instrument, emission taxes, at their disposal. 
Thus, they have to address two set of distortions with one instrument. In an 
related analysis available on request, Pflüger shows that if the national 
governments had a second instrument, say a production subsidy, the incen-
tive to misuse the emission tax for a non-environmental concern would van-
ish. In this case, both levels of government would set emission taxes equal to 
marginal damage costs. 
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Pflüger’s model can be criticised for treating capital as a continuous vari-
able, as O&S, even if it is, strictly speaking, discreet as in MMO. Thus, he 
ignores the discontinuities in a country’s welfare that may arise due to the 
number of firms discreetly declining as the tax rate at home is increased or 
the tax rate abroad is reduced. However, because the number of plants is 
not limited to one or two, as in MMO, it can be assumed that the disconti-
nuities are significantly smaller than in MMO. 
An advantage of Pflüger’s model vis-à-vis MMO is that there are no profits, 
which simplifies the analysis. In equilibrium, all economic rents as well as 
the proceeds from the pollution taxes accrue to residents in each country. 
Whereas Hoel (1997) characterises the conditions that lead to ecological-
dumping and not-in-my-back-yard, respectively, on a fairly superficial level 
as we illustrated in the previous subsection, Pflüger is able to specify the 
conditions in terms of the model’s parameters. In contrast to the oligopoly 
models that we discussed in the previous subsections, the disutility of pollu-
tion is not among the parameters that separate the non-cooperative choice 
from the cooperative choice.  
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3 A model with perfectly competitive firms 
In this section, we show that when the input and output markets for a ho-
mogeneous dirty good are perfectly competitive, non-cooperative emission 
standards are federally efficient as long as pollution is purely domestic. We 
follow Oates & Schwab (1988) with two major exceptions. First, whereas the 
original model considers two distinct sources of interstate competition, capi-
tal taxation and pollution regulation, for the sake of clarity, we only con-
sider the latter. O&S show that the countries maximise their own as well as 
joint welfare by choosing a zero tax rate on capital.  
Second, whereas O&S assume that pollution generated in one country 
doesn’t spill over into another, we allow for a continuum of cases, from 
purely domestic to perfectly transboundary pollution. The analysis shows 
that ecological dumping occurs unless pollution is purely domestic. 
3.1 Model outline 
We envision a large number of countries, say n, that are small in the sense 
that they are the price takers both in input and output markets. Workers 
are nationally mobile but internationally immobile. We assume that the 
countries can differ both in size and in tastes of its residents, but that 
within a single country, individuals are homogeneous. 
The countries compete for a fixed stock of capital, equal to Ω , by relaxing 
environmental regulations that would otherwise deflect capital elsewhere. 
As O&S, we do not explicitly consider the question of to whom the capital 
belongs. Thus, residents of a given country may or may not own capital. An 
inflow of capital raises the capital-labour ratio, /i i ik K L≡  since iL  is con-
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stant, increases the marginal product of labour, ( ), , /i i i i iF K L E L∂ ∂ , and 
consequently the wage rate, wi.5 Both levels of government, the federal and 
the national, use emission standards, iϕ , defined in terms of allowable emis-
sion per worker, as the regulatory vehicle.6 Since iL  is constant, the choice 
of iϕ  is equivalent to putting a cap of i i iE Lϕ≡  on aggregate emissions in 
country { }1,...,i n∈ . Lowering this cap increases environmental quality, but 
decreases the productivity of capital in the generation of saleable income, as 
a larger share of capital has to be devoted to abatement efforts. 
3.2 Consumer preferences 
Each consumer supplies inelastically one unit of labour without loss of util-
ity. There are no savings. Thus, a representative consumer uses all of her 
income to purchase the dirty good. Her utility, ui, is a function of her con-
sumption of it, Xi, and the amount of pollution, Oi, she is exposed to, 
( ),i i i iu u X O=  for all { }1,...,i n∈ , 
which is increasing iX  but decreasing in iO . Whereas O&S assume that 
pollution is purely domestic, we extend their model by defining 0 1θ≤ ≤  as 
the extent to which pollution is transboundary. Thus, pollution in country i, 
iO , depends not only on the choice of emission standard by country i, as in 
O&S, but also on the choice of standards by all the other countries. Specifi-
cally, we assume that: 
                                            
 
5 We use superscript to denote a particular country. 
6 In a related paper, Oates & Schwab (1996) show that none of the results change if gov-
ernments use effluent taxes instead of emission caps to regulate pollution. 
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Definition 1: Pollution in a given country is the sum of emissions from do-
mestic sources plus the spillover, if any, from foreign sources. 
Formally, using the notations established here, Definition 1 translates into 
1 1
n n
i i s i i s s
s s
s i s i
O E E L Lθ ϕ θ ϕ
= =≠ ≠
≡ + ≡ +∑ ∑  for all { }1,...,i n∈ , (1) 
where the first term on the right-hand side measures aggregate emission in 
country i and the second term the spillover from abroad to country i. If 
0θ = , pollution is purely domestic, as in O&S, whereas if 1θ = , pollution is 
perfectly transboundary. Carbon dioxide is an example of a pollutant that is 
perfectly transboundary, regardless of the size of the country from where 
the emissions originate. 
3.3 Production technology 
The homogeneous dirty good is produced under constant returns to scale 
with three factors of production: capital, Ki, labour, Li, and emissions, 
i i iE Lϕ≡ . We treat Ei as a non-purchased input. Following O&S, we assume 
that the dirty good is traded without cost in the federal market. With non-
zero transport costs, capital owned by the residents of one country would be 
available for a smaller cost for production in that country than for produc-
tion abroad. 
While the production technologies exhibit constant returns to scale in all 
three inputs, the nature of environmental policy allows producers to act as 
there were constant returns to scale in just purchased inputs, that is, capi-
tal and labour. If a producer doubles its input of labour, it is allowed to dou-
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ble its emissions. Therefore, a doubling of capital and labour implies a dou-
bling of all inputs and, hence, output.  
It follows from constant returns to scale the production function of each 
country are homogeneous of degree one in Ki, Li, and Ei. For that reason, we 
can rewrite the country specific production functions in terms of output per 
worker, 
( ) ( ), , , , ,i i i ii i i i i i i i i ii i iK L LF K L E L F L f kL L Lϕ ϕ⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  for all { }1,...,i n∈ , (2) 
where ( ) ( ), ,1,i i i i i if k F kϕ ϕ≡  and ii iKk L≡ . 
Based on Equation (2) we can write the marginal products of capital, labour 
and emissions as7 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,, , ,i i
i
i i i i i i i i
ii i i i i i i
i i iK k
K
L f k L f k LF K L E f k
K k K
ϕ ϕ ϕ
∂∂ ∂= = =∂ ∂ ∂ , 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
,
, ,
, ,
,
, , ,
, , ,
i
i i
i i
i i i i
i i i i
iL
i i
i i i i i
i ii i i i
i i i i
i i
i i i i i i i i i i
k i i
i i i i i i i i i i i
k
L f k
F K L E
L
K E
f k f kL Lf k L
k L L
K Ef k L f k f k
L L
f k k f k f k
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ ϕϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
∂= ∂
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂⎜ ⎟∂ ∂= + +⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= + − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= − −
 and 
                                            
 
7  In this section we use superscripts to denote partial derivatives. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,, , ,i i
i
i i i i i i i i
ii i i i i i i
i i iE
E
L f k L f k LF K L E f k
E E ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕϕ
∂∂ ∂= = =∂ ∂ ∂ . 
We assume that the marginal products of capital and emissions are positive 
but diminishing, as illustrated in Figure 2, and that an increase in allow-
able emissions per worker, iϕ , raises the marginal product of capital. For-
mally, ( ) ( ) 0i ii iK kF f⋅ = ⋅ > , ( ) ( ) 0i ii iEF fϕ⋅ = ⋅ > , ( ) 0i iik kf ⋅ < , ( ) 0i iifϕ ϕ ⋅ < , and 
( ) 0i iikf ϕ ⋅ > . 
Capital per worker, ki
Output per worker
( )1ˆ,i i if k ϕ
( )2 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,i i i i if k ϕ ϕ ϕ>
0  
Figure 2: Output per worker as function of capital per worker when emissions per 
worker, φi, is held constant. 
3.4 Equilibrium in the federal capital market 
Given that the capital stock is perfectly mobile, it is distributed so as to 
maximise its earnings, which implies that the return to capital, R, is 
equated across countries. As price-takers, individual countries treat R as a 
parameter. They behave as competitive firms with fixed quantities of labour 
but variable stocks of capital. Thus, each country chooses the amount of 
capital to employ, Ki, such that the marginal product of capital equals the 
market-determined rate of return on capital, 
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( ) ( ), , ,i ii i i i i i iK kF K L E f k Rϕ= =  for all { }1,...,i n∈ , (3) 
when the dirty good is chosen as the numéraire.8 Figure 3 illustrates the 
equilibrium in the federal capital market: R  adjusts until aggregate de-
mand is equal to the federation’s fixed supply of capital. 
Rate of
return
on capital
Capital0
Aggregate
supply
Aggregate
demand
( ),ii i ikf k ϕ
Country i’s
demand
( ),jj j jkf k ϕ
Country j’s
demand
i iL k j jL k Ω
R
 
Figure 3: Equilibrium in the federal capital market 
The aggregate demand for capital at some rate of return R is the horizontal 
sum of the member states’ demands. However, from the perspective of a sin-
gle country, R  is constant. Thus, the domestic stock of capital, i iL k , adjusts 
until ( ),ii i ikf k Rϕ = . Equation (3) implicitly defines the equilibrium amounts 
of capital employed by each country. Total differentiation of it yields 
 ( ) ( ), ,i i i ii i i i i ik k kf k dk f k d dRϕϕ ϕ ϕ+ = , which can be rewritten as 
( )
( ) constant 0
i i
i i
ii i
k
i i i
R k k
fdk k
d f
ϕ
ϕ ϕ
⋅∂= = − >∂ ⋅  (4) 
                                            
 
8 We use a bar over a variable to denote a long-run equilibrium value. 
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since ( ) 0i iikf ϕ ⋅ >  and ( ) 0i iik kf ⋅ < . Equation (4) tells us that an increase of idϕ  
in allowable emissions per worker increases the amount of capital per 
worker by ( ) ( )( )/i i i ii i i ik k kdk f f dϕ ϕ= − ⋅ ⋅  . 
3.5 Equilibrium in the national labour markets 
Given that labour is internationally immobile, the equilibrium wage rate is 
determined domestically. The labour market in country i is in equilibrium 
when the wage rate, iw , equals the gain from hiring an additional worker. 
The gain is equal to the sum of the marginal product of labour and the addi-
tional output that stems from the increment in permissible emissions. Thus,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i i ii i i i i i i i i iL E k kw F F f k f f f f k fϕ ϕϕ ϕ ϕ= ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ − ⋅  (5) 
As Clark (1889) was arguably the first to propose that when each factor is 
paid its marginal product, the sum of factor payments will exhaust the 
value of total output. Clark himself provided a rather lose verbal proof of 
this proposition. Wicksteed (1894) was the first to prove it mathematically. 
Wicksteed established that for Clark’s product-exhaustion theorem to hold 
the aggregate production function must be homogeneous of degree one. We 
see that Clark’s theorem holds in our model by adding up the payment to 
capital, ( ),ii i i i ikL k f k ϕ , and the payment to labour, 
( ) ( )( ), ,ii i i i i i i ikL f k k f kϕ ϕ− . We find that the sum equals the value of total 
output. 
A closer look at Equation (5) tells us that each worker is paid the value of 
her output less the rent for the ik  units of capital in her use. Partial differ-
entiation of Equation (5) with respect to ik  yields 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0i i i i i ii i i i i ii k k k k k kw f k f f k fk
∂ = ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ = − ⋅ >∂  (6) 
since ( ) 0i iik kf ⋅ < . Equation (6) tells us that the wage rate increases with more 
capital per worker. Differentiation of Equation (5) with respect to iϕ  shows 
that allowing idϕ  more emissions per worker increases the wage rate by 
( ) ( )( )i i ii i i i ikdw f k f dϕ ϕ ϕ= ⋅ − ⋅ , 
if ik remained constant. This is the direct effect. However, relaxing iϕ  must 
cause more capital to enter the country in order to keep the rate of return on 
capital constant. If  ik  changes by ( ) ( )( )/i i i ii i i ik k kdk f f dϕ ϕ= − ⋅ ⋅  as proposed by 
Equation (4), then the additional change in iw  must be 
( ) ( )i i i ii i i i i i ik k kdw k f dk k f dϕ ϕ= − ⋅ = ⋅ . 
This is the indirect effect. Thus, the net effect of allowing idϕ  more emis-
sions per worker is ( ) 0ii i idw f dϕ ϕ= ⋅ > .  
Each worker has two sources of income: exogenous income, bi, and wage in-
come, wi. Income from owning capital, if any, is included bi. Capital income 
can be disregarded because R  is constant and thus unaffected by the choice 
of emission standards. By substituting iw  from Equation (5), we can write 
the equilibrium budget constraint of a representative worker living in coun-
try i as 
( ) ( ), ,ii i i i i i i i i i ikX b w b f k k f kϕ ϕ= + = + − , (7) 
where iX  is the consumption of the dirty good. Thus, in equilibrium, each 
worker purchases the dirty good for bi, if any, and that what is left of the 
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value of her output after she has paid the rent for the ik  units of capital in 
her use. 
3.6 The cooperative choice of emission standards 
In this subsection we derive the federal government’s choice of emission 
standards. Because of asymmetry, the federal government’s choice of envi-
ronmental standards may vary from country to country. The federal gov-
ernment maximises the equilibrium welfare of a representative consumer in 
one country, say { }1,...,i n∈ , while allowing a representative consumer in 
every other country to attain utility no less than ˆ su , where { }1,...,s n∈  and 
s i≠ . Because of asymmetry, ˆ su  can vary across states. The Lagrangian for 
the federal government’s problem can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
1
, , ,
,
ˆ ,
i
i
i i i i i i i i i i i i
k
i i i
k
n
s s s s s
s
s i
u X O X b f k k f k
f k R
u u X O
λ ϕ ϕ
γ ϕ
ξ
=≠
⎡ ⎤Γ ≡ − − − +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦∑
, (8) 
where λ  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint  
(7) of country i, γ  the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint on 
the rate of return on capital (3) in country i, and sξ  the Lagrange multipli-
ers associated with the constraints on not reducing the welfare abroad below 
a certain level. Since ˆ/s suξ = −∂Γ ∂ , we can interpret sξ  as the non-negative 
shadow price, measured in units of iu , that country i has to pay for increas-
ing utility in country s. ˆ/ su∂Γ ∂  must be smaller than zero because increas-
ing ˆ su  reduces the feasible set of  iϕ , and thus the maximum value of iu . 
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Therefore, sξ  must be larger than zero.9 Partial differentiation of Equation 
(8) with respect to iX , ik  and iϕ  yields the first-order conditions,10 
( ), 0ii i ii Xu X OX λ∂Γ = − =∂ , (9) 
( ) ( ), , 0i i i ii i i i i i ii k k k kk f k f kk λ ϕ γ ϕ∂Γ = − − =∂  and (10) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
, , , ,
, 0
i i i i i i
s
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i O k k
n
i s s s s
O
s
s i
Lu X O f k k f k f k
L u X O
ϕ ϕ ϕλ ϕ λ ϕ γ ϕϕ
θ ξ
=≠
∂Γ = + − −∂
+ =∑  (11) 
By substituting the first-order conditions (9) and (10) into condition (11) we 
obtain the necessary conditions for the federal government’s choice of 
1,..., nϕ ϕ , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
, , , ,i i i s
n
i i i i i i i i i i i s s s s
X O O
s
s i
u X O f k L u X O L u X Oϕ ϕ θ ξ=≠− −
= − − ∑????? ?????  (12) 
for all { }1,...,i n∈ . A decomposition of Equation (12) reveals the following: in 
the cooperative equilibrium, the increase in material welfare that additional 
emissions would bring the residents of one country must equal the disutility 
that it would cause both to them and to the residents of other countries in 
the form of more pollution. 
                                            
 
9 In the special case where emissions are purely domestic 0sξ =  for all s  because changes 
in iϕ  has no effect on welfare abroad. 
10 Given the definition of pollution (1), it follows that ( ) /i i iO Lϕ∂ ⋅ ∂ =  and that 
/s i iO Lϕ θ∂ ∂ = , { }, 1,...,i s n∈ , s i≠ . 
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3.7 The non-cooperative choice of emission standards 
In this subsection we address the question of how the non-cooperative choice 
of emission standards differs from the cooperative choice. We start with de-
riving a condition similar to Equation (12) for the non-cooperative choice.  
When left on their own, national governments seek to maximise the welfare 
of their constituencies. Since individuals within a single country are homo-
geneous, we can determine the non-cooperative choice of emission standard 
by maximising the welfare of any representative consumer subject to the 
same budget constraint and the same constraint on the rate of return on 
capital as in the cooperative case. However, because national governments 
only care for benefits and costs that accrue to domestic residents, we omit 
the constraints on not reducing the welfare of foreign residents below a cer-
tain level. We write the Lagrangians for the national governments’ maximi-
sation problems as 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
, , ,
,
i
i
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
k
i i i i
k
u X O X b f k k f k
f k R
λ ϕ ϕ
γ ϕ
⎡ ⎤Λ ≡ − − − +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
   
for all { }1,...,i n∈ , where iλ  are the Lagrange multipliers associated with 
the budget constraints and iγ  the Lagrange multipliers associated with the 
constraints on the rate of return. Partial differentiation of the Lagrangians 
with respect to iX , ik  and iϕ  yields the first-order conditions,11 
( ), 0ii i i i ii Xu X OX λ∂Λ = − =∂ , (13)  
                                            
 
11 Given the definition of pollution (1), it follows that ( ) /i i iO Lϕ∂ ⋅ ∂ = . 
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( ) ( ), , 0i i i ii i i i i i i i i ii k k k kk f k f kk λ ϕ γ ϕ∂Λ = − − =∂  and (14) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , 0i i i i i ii i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i ii O k kLu X O f k k f k f kϕ ϕ ϕλ ϕ λ ϕ γ ϕϕ∂Λ = + − − =∂  (15)  
for all { }1,...,i n∈ . By substituting the first-order conditions (13) and (14) 
into condition (15) we obtain the necessary condition for each country’s non-
cooperative choice of iϕ ,  
( ) ( ) ( ), , ,i i ii i i i i i i i i iX Ou X O f k L u X Oϕ ϕ
−
= − ?????  for all { }1,...,i n∈ . (16) 
Allowing more emissions per worker, affects the welfare of domestic resi-
dents through two channels, as we illustrate in Figure 4. First, it increases 
the level of pollution that domestic residents are exposed to. Second, as we 
demonstrate in Subsections 3.4 and 3.5, it increases the marginal product of 
capital, which induces more capital to enter the country. Additional capital 
per worker raises the marginal productivity of labour and thus wages paid 
to domestic workers. 
iϕ ik iX iuiw
iO
Policy
instrument:
allowable
emission
per worker Capital
per worker
Wage
rate
Per capita
consump-
tion of the 
dirty good
Per
capita
utility
Level of
pollution
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Figure 4: Effects of a marginal relaxation of environmental policy in one country on 
the welfare of its citizens. 
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In the non-cooperative equilibrium, as defined by Equation (16), the de-
crease in utility due to more pollution must equal the increase in utility due 
to more consumption. Comparing the condition for the non-cooperative 
choice with the condition for the cooperative choice, Equation (12), we can 
establish that: 
Proposition 1: In perfect product market competition, non-cooperative emis-
sion standards are federally efficient as long as pollution is purely domestic. 
Proof: When 0θ = , condition (16) is identical with condition (12) and the 
non-cooperative choice coincides with the cooperative choice. □ 
Proposition 2: If pollution generated in one country spill over into another, 
i.e. when 0θ > , without cooperation, all member states choose less strict 
emission standards than the federal government. 
Proof: We employ the following strategy to find out if the national govern-
ments have an incentive to depart from the cooperative choice of emission 
standards: we establish the sign of the partial derivatives /i iϕ∂Λ ∂ , as de-
fined by Equation (15), in the cooperative equilibrium. If /i iϕ∂Λ ∂  are posi-
tive (negative) for all { }1,...,i n∈ , national governments have an incentive to 
raise (lower) their emission standards above (below) the cooperative level. 
Substituting the cooperative condition (12) into Equation (15) yields 
( )
1
in the
cooperative  
equilibria
, 0s
n
i s s s s
i O
s
s i
L u X Oθ ξϕ =≠
∂Λ = − >∂ ∑  for all { }1,...,i n∈ . (17) 
39 
since 0θ > , 0sξ >  and ( ), 0ss s sOu X O <  for all { }1,...,s n∈ , s i≠ . Thus, the 
national governments have an incentive to raise their emission standards 
above the cooperative level. □ 
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4 A model with monopolistically competitive firms  
In this section we study the non-cooperative choice of emission taxes in a 
symmetric two-country model with monopolistically competitive firms. Our 
exposition follows Pflüger (2001) with one major exception: where Pflüger, 
following O&S, assumes purely domestic pollution, our analysis allows for 
pollution to spill from one country into another. As in our extension of 
O&S’s model, we assume that pollution is a public bad. We use a single pa-
rameter to capture the extent to which pollution is transboundary. 
Unfortunately, without assigning values to at least one of the model’s pa-
rameters, we are not able to tell whether the national governments, when 
left on their own, choose lower or higher tax rates than the federal govern-
ment. However, for the extreme case where pollution is perfectly trans-
boundary, we find that ecological dumping occurs, regardless of the choice of 
values for the model’s other parameters. 
4.1 Similarities and dissimilarities with Oates & Schwab’s 
model 
Here, the basic setup is the same as in O&S: the countries compete for a 
fixed stock of capital, equal to Ω , by relaxing their environmental regula-
tions. However, instead of assuming a federation of a large number of small 
states with firms that are perfectly competitive as O&S, here we assume a 
federation of two large states, home and foreign, with firms that are mono-
polistically competitive. Additionally, whereas O&S assume that the mem-
ber states may differ in a number of respects, here we assume, for the sake 
of simplicity, that the member states are identical in every respect. 
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Here, both levels of government use an emission tax to regulate pollution, 
defined per unit of emissions. The difference to the regulatory vehicle as-
sumed by O&S is that an emission tax generates income, whereas an emis-
sion standard doesn’t. 
Whereas O&S assume one perfectly competitive sector, here we assume one 
perfectly and one monopolistically competitive sector. The competitive sector 
produces a homogeneous clean good under constant return to scale using la-
bour as the only input. The monopolistically competitive sector produces dif-
ferentiated goods under increasing return to scale with three factors of pro-
duction: capital, labour and emissions, the same as in O&S. Each variety is 
supplied by a single firm. To start a firm, one unit of capital is required. 
Hence, the number of varieties is equal to the number of firms, which is de-
termined by the size of the capital stock. Thus, N N ∗+ = Ω , where N is the 
number firms producing at home and N* the number of firms producing 
abroad.12 To tie down the wage rate, we assume that the clean good can be 
traded without cost whereas the differentiated goods incur transport costs if 
exported from one country to the other. 
Whereas there are no transboundary externalities, neither trade-related nor 
pollution-related, in O&S’s model, here, six transboundary externalities 
emerge, four of the former and two of the latter type. Raising the emission 
tax rate at home induces firms to move their production abroad. As a conse-
quence, (1) pollution increases, (2) tax income grows and (3) consumer prices 
                                            
 
12 As a notational device, we employ both subscript and superscript. We use subscript to 
denote a particular firm and superscript to denote a particular country. The index i is used 
to separate between individual firms producing at home and the index j to separate be-
tween individual firms producing abroad. To keep home and foreign variables apart, we de-
note foreign variables with an asterisk. Therefore, jp∗ , for example, is the price for which 
variety j, manufactured by the foreign firm j, sells abroad. 
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fall in the foreign country. Foreign consumer prices fall because of transport 
cost savings for goods whose production is moved to the foreign country. Ad-
ditionally, as a consequence of raising the emission tax rate at home, pro-
duction costs increase for remaining domestic firms, which raises prices for 
both domestic as well as (4) foreign consumers. In addition to these trade-
related externalities, with transboundary pollution, two additional external-
ities emerge. Raising the emission tax at home reduces the pollution spill-
over from home to abroad because it reduces both the (5) number of firms 
producing at home as well as the (6) firms’ per-firm emissions.  
4.2 Consumer preferences 
Given that the number of consumers per country, L and L∗ , are constant, we 
can normalise 1L L∗= = , without loss of generality. Thus, there is one do-
mestic and one foreign consumer. By maximising their direct utility func-
tions, we obtain the Marshallian demands for the two types of goods avail-
able. By substituting the Marshallian demands back into the direct utility 
functions we obtain the indirect utility functions, on which we base our 
analysis of the choice of emission taxes in Subsection 4.5. 
We start with the direct utility functions. Following Pflüger (2001), we as-
sume that utility, u, is linear in consumption of the clean good, a, and linear 
in exposure to pollution, O, but non-linear in consumption of the goods 
whose production generates emissions. For the home consumer: 
lnu a X Oα η= + − , where (18) 
11 1
1 1
N N N
i j
i j N
X x x
σ
σσ σ
σ σ
∗ −+− −
= = +
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  (19) 
43 
is utility over varieties produced at home, ix , and abroad, jx . The elasticity 
of substitution between different varieties is constant and equal to 1σ > , as 
in Dixit & Stiglitz (1977). A formal proof of this property is provided in 
Appendix A. Because X is homogenous of degree one in its arguments, we 
can treat the utility over the differentiated goods as any other good in the 
economy whose price given by 
( )
1
111
1 1
N N N
i j
i j N
P p tp
σσσ
∗ −+ −−
= = +
⎛ ⎞≡ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  , 
when the clean good is chosen as the numéraire. Henceforth, we refer to X 
as the dirty good. We show in Appendix A that P  corresponds to the cost of 
a unit of X when the individual varieties are consumed in optimal propor-
tions. We note that P is increasing in prices of individual varieties, ip  and 
jp , and in transport costs, t.   
The parameter 1t >  formalises transport costs of the iceberg type. The ice-
berg analogy was introduced by Samuelson (1954, p. 268) in his discussion 
of international trade in the presence of transport costs. Samuelson wrote 
that “to carry each good across the ocean you must pay some of the good it-
self”. We define 0 1/ 1t< <  as the fraction of the exported goods that arrives 
for consumption. The rest, 1 1/ t− , melt in transit. Hence, for one unit to ar-
rive at its destination, t units must be shipped. Given that a foreign pro-
ducer charges jp  for every unit she ships overseas, transport costs raise the 
price of imported varieties to jtp . 
The parameter 0η >  measures disutility caused by a unit of pollution. Fol-
lowing Definition 1, we assume that pollution, O, is equal to aggregate 
emissions of firms producing at home plus the spillover, if any, from abroad, 
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1 1
N N N
i j
i j N
O e eθ
∗+ ∗
= = +
≡ +∑ ∑ , (20) 
where ei is the emissions of firm { }1,...,i N∈  and je∗  is the emissions of firm 
{ }1,...,j N N N ∗∈ + + . Firm symmetry allows us to drop the subscripts and 
rewrite Equation (20) as 
O Ne N eθ ∗ ∗= + , (21) 
where e  is the emissions of a representative home and e∗  the emissions of a 
representative foreign firm. The home consumer maximises her utility, as 
given by Equation (18), subject to the budget constraint  
a PX m+ = , 
where m denotes her income. We write the Lagrangian for her maximisation 
problem as ( )lnL a X O a PX mα η λ≡ + − − + − , where λ  is the Lagrange 
multiplier associated with the budget constraint. By rearranging the first-
order conditions, 1 0λ− = , / 0X Pα λ− =  and 0a PX m+ − = , we obtain the 
Marshallian demands for the clean and dirty good, respectively, as 
a m α= −  and (22) 
X
P
α= . (23) 
Equation (23) reveals that the demand for the dirty good is independent of 
income. We note that this is a standard property of quasi-linear preferences 
(Varian 1992, p. 164). Multiplying the demand for the dirty good, / Pα , by 
its price, P, we find that the expenditure, y, on the dirty good is equal to the 
preference parameter α . By substituting y y α∗= =  into Equations (A8) and 
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(A12), we can rewrite the home and foreign consumer’s Marshallian de-
mands for varieties produce in the home country as 
1
i ix p P
σ σα − −=  and (24) 
( ) 1i ix tp Pσ σα −∗ ∗ ∗ −= , respectively, for all { }1,...,i N∈ . (25) 
By substituting Equations (21), (22) and (23) into the direct utility function 
(18) of the home consumer we obtain her indirect utility, as a function of in-
come, prices and pollution. 
( )lnv m Ne N ePαα α η θ ∗ ∗⎛ ⎞= − + − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , (26) 
which tells us that utility is increasing in income but decreasing in prices 
and pollution. As in O&S, we assume that each consumer supplies inelasti-
cally one unit of labour without loss of utility. Additionally, we assume that 
each owns half of the capital stock and receives the proceeds from the emis-
sion tax applied in her country of residence. If we let w denote the wage rate 
and R the rate of return on capital, we can write the income of the home 
consumer as 
2
m w R NeψΩ= + + , (27) 
where ψ  is the emission tax chosen by the home country. The indirect util-
ity of the foreign consumer follows by symmetry,  
( )lnv m N e NePαα α η θ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗⎛ ⎞= − + − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , (28) 
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as does equilibrium income, 
2
m w R N eψ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗Ω= + + . (29) 
4.3 The firms’ choice of prices  
In the previous subsection, we examined the demand side of the economy.  
Here, we turn to the supply side. We follow the same steps as we did in de-
riving the indirect utility functions. First, we derive the firms’ choice of 
prices. Second, by substituting choice of prices into the objective functions, 
we derive the profit functions. The profit functions prove to be useful in our 
analysis of the market equilibrium, the subject of the next subsection. 
Following Pflüger (2001), we assume that the clean good is produced in both 
countries under constant returns to scale using labour as the only input. 
Specifically, we assume that one unit of labour produces one unit of output. 
Because the market for the clean good is perfectly competitive, labour is 
paid its marginal product, which is equal to a unit of the clean good. Thus, 
the equilibrium wage rate is unity in both countries, 1w w∗= = . 
The differentiated goods are manufactured by monopolistically competitive 
firms under increasing returns to scale with three factors of production: 
capital, labour and emissions. Once a unit of capital has been installed, pro-
duction takes place under constant returns to scale with regard to labour 
and emissions. Assuming Cobb-Douglas technology, the output of variety i 
can be written as  
1
i i iq l e
β β−= , 
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where li denotes labour employed and ei emissions generated by firm i. 
0 1β≤ ≤  is a technological parameter that measures the importance of la-
bour relative to emissions in production. Minimising the variable cost, 
1
1 11 i i i i il e l x l
β
β βψ ψ − −⋅ + = + ,  
of producing variety i, gives us firm i’s conditional demand for labour and 
emissions, respectively, 
( ) 11 11i il qββ ββ β ψ−− −= −  and (30) 
( )11 1 1i i i ie x l q
β
ββ ββ β β β ψ− −− −= = − ,  (31) 
where ψ  is the tax rate at home. By multiplying factor prices with factor 
demands we find the total variable cost of producing in the home country, 
( ) ( ) ( ) 111 1i i i il e q cqββ βψ β ψ β −− −⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ = − = , 
which reveals that the average variable cost is constant and equal to 
( ) 1 11c ββ ββ β ψ−− −≡ − . (32) 
With constant average variable cost, marginal cost is equal to average vari-
able cost. The elasticity of the average variable cost of producing at home 
with respect to the home tax rate is constant an equal to 
, 1 0cψε β= − > , (33) 
but zero with respect to the foreign tax rate, 
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, 0cψε ∗ = . 
Equation (33) implies that tightening environmental policy by one percent 
increases the average variable cost of producing by 1 β−  percent. The tax 
elasticities of the average variable cost of producing abroad follow by sym-
metry, 
, 1c ψε β∗ ∗ = −  and 
, 0c ψε ∗ =  (34) 
Armed with definition (32) we can rewrite the factor demands of firm i (30) 
and (31), as 
i il cqβ=  and 
( ) 11i ie cqβ ψ −= − . (35) 
We assume that a representative producer can price discriminate between 
the home and foreign market. She chooses ip  and ip∗  such as to maximise 
the sum of sales, i i i ip x p tx∗ ∗+ , less variable and fixed costs, ( )i ic x tx R∗+ + . 
We note that part of the foreign demand is indirect demand caused by 
transport costs: for ix∗  units to arrive its destination, itx∗  units must be 
shipped. 
We show in Appendix A that domestic demand for variety i is equal to 
1
i ix p P
σ σα − −= . Thus, the choice of ip  affects ix  through two channels. Di-
rectly through ip , and indirectly through P. Following Pflüger (2001), we 
assume that a representative producer disregards the latter, which is analo-
gous to assuming that she treats σ−  as the exact price elasticity of demand. 
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We note that Pflüger’s assumption is plausible as long as the number of va-
rieties is large. 
Assuming a constant price elasticity of demand in both markets equal to 
σ− , we find that a profit maximising producer chooses prices 
1i i
p p cσσ
∗= = − , (36) 
and thus leaves the option of price discrimination unused. We note that 
prices are set as constant mark-ups on marginal costs. The mark-up is de-
creasing in σ , which is an inverse indicator of the firms’ market power. 
When σ → ∞ , prices are set equal to marginal cost.  
By substituting the choice of ip  and ip∗  into the objective function, 
( )i i i i i ip x p tx c x tx R∗ ∗ ∗+ − + − , where 1i ix p Pσ σα − −=  and ( ) 1i ix tp Pσ σα −∗ ∗ ∗ −=  as 
given in Equations (24) and (25), we can write a representative home firm’s 
maximum profits as  
( )1 1 1 11i c P t P R
σ
σ σ σα σπ σ σ
−
− − ∗ −⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ . (37) 
By symmetry, we can write a representative foreign firm’s choice of prices as 
1j j
p p cσσ
∗ ∗= = − , and its maximum profits as (38) 
1
1 1 1
1j
c P t P R
σ
σ σ σα σπ σ σ
−∗
∗ ∗ − − −⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤= + −⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦−⎝ ⎠
.  (39) 
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4.4 Characterisation of the market equilibrium 
Here, we turn to the analysis of the market equilibrium. Our objective is to 
solve for the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables in terms of the 
exogenous variables and to derive the corresponding tax elasticises.  
We start with the number of firms producing at home and abroad, respec-
tively. In monopolistic competition, profits vanish in the long run. Using this 
observation, our analysis in Appendix B shows that  
( )
( )( )
1 2
2 1 1
N
γ γγ
γ γ
∗ ∗
∗
Ω − += − − , and that 
( )
( )( )
1 2
2 1 1
N
γ γγ
γ γ
∗
∗
∗
Ω − += − − , 
where ( )1/tc c σγ −∗≡  and ( )1/tc c σγ −∗ ∗≡  to simplify notation.13 Additionally, it 
shows that 
( )( )
( )
1
2, 1
2 1 1
1N
t
t
σ
ψ σ
β σε
−
−
− −=
−
, (40) 
and that ,, NN ψψε ε∗ = − . Since all factors on the right-hand side of Equation 
(40) are positive except ( )1 σ− , we find that , 0N ψε <  and , 0N ψε ∗ > . The in-
tuition is the following: while the total number of firms is determined by the 
capital stock, N N ∗+ = Ω , the number of firms producing at home depends 
on the cost of production at home relative to abroad, and thus ultimately on 
the choice of ψ  and ψ ∗ . Raising ψ  from its equilibrium level drives profits 
of firms producing at home below zero, which induces a relocation abroad. 
Consequently, N ∗  increases at the cost of N until profits are back to zero. 
                                            
 
13 We use a bar over a variable to denote a long-run equilibrium value. 
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Substituting the equilibrium values of N  and N ∗  into the zero-profit condi-
tion (B5) yields  
2R ασ= Ω ,  
which tells us that the equilibrium rate of return is decreasing in the capital 
stock, Ω , but independent of the choice of emission taxes. Thus, 
, , 0R Rψ ψε ε ∗= = .  
Next, we consider the price of the dirty good. By substituting the firms’ 
choice of prices into the definitions of P and P∗, as we do in Appendix C, it 
turns out that 
( ) 11 111P Nc N tc σ σσσσ − −− ∗ ∗⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦−  and ( )
1
1 11
1
P N tc N cσ σσσσ
− −∗ ∗ ∗ −⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦− , 
and that the elasticities of P  and P ∗  with respect to the home tax rate can 
be written as  
( )( )
1
,, 1 , 11
1 1 1 0
1 11 1cP N
t
t tt
σ
ψψ σ ψ σσ
βε ε εσ
−
− −−
− −= + = >+ −− +  and (41) 
( )( )
( ) 11 1
,1 , 1, 1
11 0
1 11 1c NP
tt t
t tt
σσ σ
ψσ ψ σψ σ
βε ε εσ∗
−− −
− −−
−−= − = − <+ −− + ,  (42) 
respectively. Equations (41) and (42) tell us that a raise in ψ  affects the 
price of the dirty good, both at home and abroad, through two channels: di-
rectly through c since firms set prices as constant mark-ups on average 
variable cost, and indirectly by shifting production abroad. The direct effect, 
which we henceforth call the production-cost effect, is price-increasing for 
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both countries. The indirect effect is price-increasing for the home country 
but price-decreasing for the foreign country. Since all producers charge the 
same price in equilibrium, shifting the production of a variety aboard in-
creases (decreases) its price in the home (foreign) country by 1t > . Following 
Krugman (1980, p. 995), we call this the home-market effect.  
Since 11 0t σ−− >  for all values of 1σ >  and 1t > , we find that the net effect 
of the production-cost effect and the home-market effect is price-increasing 
for the home country, but price-decreasing for the foreign country.14 Thus, 
for a given increase in the home tax rate, the home-market effect outweighs 
the production-cost effect for the foreign country. 
Next, we turn to the equilibrium output of each variety. Firm i supplies the 
amount demanded at the profit-maximising prices (36). In equilibrium, sup-
ply must equal demand, 
( ) ( )1 1 1 1 11i i i i i cq x tx p P t tp P P t P
σσσ σ σ σ σ σσα α α σ
−−∗ − − ∗ ∗ − − − ∗ −⎛ ⎞= + = + = +⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ , (43)  
where 1i ix p Pσ σα − −=  is domestic demand and ( ) 1i itx t tp Pσ σα −∗ ∗ ∗ −=  is foreign 
demand, and ( )/ 1i ip p cσ σ∗= = −  is the profit maximising prices. By substi-
tuting the zero-profit condition (B3) into Equation (43), we can write the 
equilibrium output of variety i as a function of R and c, 
( ) ( )1 12 11iq Rc cα σσ σ− −
−= − = Ω  since 2 /R α σ= Ω . (44) 
                                            
 
14  We see that 11 0t σ−− >  holds for all values of 1t >  and 1σ > by taking the natural loga-
rithm of both sides of 11 t σ−> . We get ( )0 1 lntσ> − , which is always true because 1 0σ− <  
53 
Additionally, by substituting iq  into firm i’s conditional demand for emis-
sion (35) and dropping the firm index because of symmetry, we can write the 
equilibrium emissions of a representative firm producing at home as 
( )( ) 12 1 1e α β σ ψσ −
− −= Ω . (45) 
Equation (45) reveals that the equilibrium emissions of a home firm are in-
versely proportional to the home tax rate, but independent of the foreign tax 
rate. Thus, , 1e ψε = −  and , 0e ψε ∗ = . By symmetry, , 1e ψε ∗ ∗ = −  and , 0e ψε ∗ = . 
Based on Subsection 4.2, a representative consumer has three sources of in-
come: wage income, capital income, and tax income. The first two are inde-
pendent of the choice of tax rates because 1w w∗= =  and , , 0R Rψ ψε ε ∗= = . 
However, the third is affected both directly, through (1) the tax payable per 
unit of emissions, and indirectly, through (2) the number of firms paying the 
tax and (3) the per-firm emissions. By utilising , , 1e eψ ψε ε ∗ ∗= = − , we find that 
the (1) and (3) cancel each other. Thus, the net effect is determined by the 
change in the number of firms paying the tax, 
, , 0m N
Ne
mψ ψ
ψε ε= <  since , 0N ψε <  and (46) 
, , 0m N
N e
mψ ψ
ψε ε∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗
∗= >  since , 0N ψε ∗ > . (47) 
In other words, the net effect of increasing ψ  is income decreasing for the 
home country but income increasing for the foreign country. 
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4.5 The cooperative and non-cooperative choice of emission taxes 
Here, armed with the indirect utility functions, derived in Subsection 4.2, 
and the tax elasticities, derived in Subsection 4.4, we address the question 
of whether or not the national governments’ choice of tax rates coincide with 
that of the federal government’s. Given the assumption of symmetry, the 
welfare maximising tax rates must be equal, both in the cooperative and 
non-cooperative case. Thus, ψ ψ ∗= , and consequently / 2N N ∗= = Ω , e e ∗=  
and m m∗= . 
In both cases, the cooperative and non-cooperative, the choice of emission 
taxes is based on the indirect utilities, v  and v∗ , of the home and foreign 
consumer, respectively. Differentiation of the equilibrium values of v and v∗  
with respect to the home tax rate yields 
( )
( )( )
tax-income  production- emissions-per-home-home-market effect ( )  effect ( ) cost effect ( )      firm effect (+) 
1
, ,, 1 ,1
1
1 2 1 21 1
2
c eN N
tv e e
t t
σ
ψ ψψ σ ψσ
αψ αψ ε ε ε η εψ σ
η
−− −
−
− −
−∂ Ω Ω= − − −∂ + − +
Ω−
????????????????????? ?????
, ,
     pollution- pollution-feedback
shifting effect (+)          effect (
2N N
e eψ ψε ηθ ε ∗
−)
Ω−
???????????
 and (48) 
( )
( )( )
production-tax-income emissions-per-home-home-market effect (+)cost effect ( )  effect ( )      firm effect (+) 
11
, ,1 ,, 1
1
1 2 1 21 1c eNN
tv te e
t t
σσ
ψ ψσ ψψ σ
αψ αψ ε ε ε ηθ εψ σ∗
−+
−∗ −
− −
−∂ Ω Ω= − + −∂ + − +
????????????????????? ???
,,
      pollution- pollution-feedback
shifting effect ( )          effect (
2 2 NN
e e ψψη ε ηθ ε∗
− +)
Ω Ω− −
??
??????????
, (49) 
respectively, where Ω  is the fixed stock of capital, and / 2Ω  the number of 
firms producing in each country in equilibrium. Decomposition of Equations 
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(48) and (49) tells us that a marginal increase in the home tax rate affects 
welfare at home and abroad, respectively, through six channels. We provide 
an illustration of these channels for the home country in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5: Effects of a marginal tightening of domestic environmental policy on wel-
fare at home. 
Next, we employ the same strategy as we did in analysing the non-
cooperative choice in the model with monopolistically competitive firms. 
First, we derive the cooperative choice of emission taxes, Coopψ . Second, we 
establish the sign of the partial derivative /v ψ∂ ∂  in the cooperative equi-
librium to find out whether the national governments have an incentive de-
part from Coopψ . If /v ψ∂ ∂  is negative (positive) in the cooperative equilib-
rium, the national governments have an incentive to lower (raise) their tax 
rates below (above) the cooperative level. 
We start with Coopψ . The federal government maximises joint welfare as 
given by the sum of the v and v ∗ . The first-order conditions for the federal 
government’s problem are to choose ψ  such that / / 0v vψ ψ∗∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ =  and 
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ψ ∗  such that / / 0v vψ ψ∗ ∗ ∗∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ = . Because ψ ψ ∗= , it suffices to look at the 
choice of ψ . The choice of ψ ∗  follows by symmetry.  
Next, we analyse the sum of /v ψ∂ ∂  and /v ψ∗∂ ∂ , term by term, as given by 
Equations (48) and (49). The first terms on the right-hand side represent the 
tax-income effects, which affect welfare through consumption of the clean 
good, as illustrated in Figure 5. Given that ,, NN ψψε ε∗ = − , based on Appendix 
B, we find that the tax-income effects cancel each other: a marginal increase 
of ψ  from its equilibrium level, ψ ψ ∗= , reduces the home consumer’s in-
come, and consequently welfare, in the same proportion as it increases the 
foreign consumer’s income and welfare.  
The second and third terms represent the production-cost and home-market 
effects, respectively, presented in the previous subsection. The home-market 
effects cancel each other whereas the production-cost effects do not because 
they are both negative. By simple calculus we can establish that the net ef-
fect of the production-cost effects on joint welfare is 
 ( ), 1 0cψαε α βψ ψ
−− = − <  
given that , 1cψε β= − . Utility decreases because consumption of the dirty 
good decreases as a result of higher prices. Before proceeding with term-by-
term analysis, we note that this is the marginal net cost of tightening envi-
ronmental policy from the federal goverment’s perspective. 
The fourth, fifth and sixth terms represent effects that work through the 
level of pollution, O and O∗ . The fourth terms represent the emissions-per-
home-firm effects: lower per-firm emissions at home improves environmental 
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quality in both countries because it reduces the level of pollution at home, 
and thus the spillover, if any, from home to abroad. By simple calculus we 
can establish that sum of the emissions-per-home-firm effects is 
( )1 0
2
eη θ
ψ
+ Ω > . 
This is the marginal net benefit of tightening environmental regulation from 
the federal government’s perspective, since the fifth and sixth terms cancel 
each other pairwise, since ,, NN ψψε ε∗ = − . 
The fifth and sixth terms represent the pollution-shifting effects and pollu-
tion-feedback effects, respectively. Shifting production abroad reduces pollu-
tion at home in the same proportion as it increases it abroad. However, if 
pollution is transboundary, i.e. 0θ > , some of the shifted pollution spills 
back into the home country through the pollution-feedback effect. In the ex-
treme case with perfectly transboundary pollution, i.e. 1θ = , shifting pro-
duction abroad does not reduce pollution at home. 
The federal government chooses Coopψ  such that the marginal net cost and 
marginal net benefit from a marginal increase in ψ  are equal, 
( ) ( )1 1
2
eα β η θ
ψ ψ
− + Ω= , 
where ( )( ) 12 1 1 /e α β σ ψ σ−= − − Ω , based on Equation (45). We state the 
federal government’s choice of emission taxes in: 
Proposition 3: The emission taxes chosen by the federal government are 
given by 
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( )( )1 1Coop η θ σψ σ
+ −= . (50) 
By substituting Coopψ  back into Equation (45) we find the per-firm emissions 
in the cooperative equilibrium, 
( )
( )
2 1
1
Coope
α β
η θ
−= + Ω . (51) 
Except for the pollution spillover factor ( )1 θ+ , Proposition 3 is identical 
with the cooperative choice reported by Pflüger (2001, p. 700). Pflüger’s 
model is a special case, with 0θ = , of our model. The number of consumers 
is not present in Equation (51) as in Pflüger, because we normalise 
1L L∗= = , without loss of generality but some gain in clarity.  
The partial derivative of Coopψ  with respect to θ  is positive and the partial 
derivative of Coope  with respect to θ  is negative. Thus, the tax rate that 
maximises joint welfare is higher and equilibrium emissions lower if pollu-
tion spill from one country into another than if it doesn’t. The optimal emis-
sions are lower with transboundary pollution because we assume that pollu-
tion is a public bad in the sense that one individual’s consumption of it 
doesn’t reduce the amount of pollution available to others. By utilising the 
elasticities derived in Subsection 4.4, we can rewrite Equation (48) as 
( ) ( )( ), 1 ,1 1 11 2 1 2N Nv e etψ σ ψα βψ ψ ε η θ εψ −−∂ Ω Ω= − + + −∂ − ,  (52) 
where e  is determined by ψ , based on Equation (45). By substituting 
Coopψ ψ=  and factoring out common positive components, we obtain15 
                                            
 
15 See Appendix D for intermediate steps. 
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( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
11
2 1 11
2 1 1 2 11
1 11 1Coop
ttv
t tt
σσ
σ σσψ ψ
σ θβ θ σα β
ψ ση θ
−−
− −−
=
⎛ ⎞+− − −−∂ ⎜ ⎟= −⎜ ⎟∂ − −+ − ⎝ ⎠
. (53) 
Since ( )( ) ( )
1
2 1
1 0
1 1
t
t
σ
σ
α β
η θ
−
−
− >+ −  we can establish that: 
Proposition 4: Without cooperation, national governments choose lower 
(higher) tax rates than the feral government if 
( )
( )
( ) ( )( )1
1 1
2 1 1 2 1
0
1 1
t
t t
σ
σ σ
σ θ β θ σ
σ
−
− −
+ − − −− >− −  (if 0< ),  (54) 
in which case, the non-cooperative equilibrium is characterised by ecological 
dumping (not-in-my-back-yard) using the terminology that we established in 
the introductory section,. 
Equation (54) is the net result of the interaction of the six terms on the 
right-hand side of Equation (48). Four of them work in favour of ecological 
dumping while two of them work against it. The first, third, fifth and sixth 
term work through N and N N∗ = Ω − , that is, the number of firms at home 
and abroad, respectively.  
The preference parameter α  and the disutility parameter η  are not in-
cluded in Equation (54). Thus, they work neither in favour nor against eco-
logical dumping. The technological parameter β  and the spillover parame-
ter θ  work both in favour of ecological dumping, whereas the elasticity 
parameter σ  and the transport-cost parameter t may work either in favour 
of or against it. All things considered, we are not able to say whether eco-
logical dumping or not-in-my-back-yard occurs without assigning a specific 
value to at least one of the following: β , θ ,  t, or σ . 
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4.5.1 Purely domestic pollution 
When pollution is purely domestic, i.e.  0θ = , Proposition 4 translates into: 
Proposition 5: In the special case where 0θ = , without cooperation, na-
tional governments choose lower (higher) tax rates than the feral government 
if 
( )
1
2 1 0
1 1 t σ
βσ
σ −
−− >− −  ( 0< ). (55) 
Proposition 5 is equivalent to Proposition 3 in Pflüger (2001, p. 702).  
Pflüger gives the following interpretation of it: ecological dumping occurs 
(not-in-my-back-yard) if the importance of emissions in production, 1 β− , is 
small (large) relative to transport costs, t, and the mark-up, ( )/ 1σ σ − . Thus, 
as in Proposition 4, we are not able to say whether ecological dumping or 
not-in-my-back-yard occurs without assigning a specific value to at least one 
of the three remaining parameters in Equation (55). 
4.5.2 Perfectly transboundary pollution 
Whereas the intuition for the special case where 0θ =  remains vague, for 
the other extreme case we find that: 
Proposition 6: In the special case where 1θ = , without cooperation, na-
tional governments choose lower tax rates than the feral government, regard-
less of the choice of values for β , t, and σ . 
Proof: When 1θ = , Equation (54) is equivalent to 
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( )
( )
( )( )1
1 1
1 4 1 1 0
1 1
t
t t
σ
σ σ
σ β σ
σ
−
− −
+ − −− <− − , 
which is always true because the first term is positive and the second term 
negative regardless of the choice of 0 1β≤ ≤ , 1σ > and 1t > . □ 
As θ  increases, the pollution-feedback effect, sixth term in Equation (48), 
becomes gradually stronger and eventually cancels the pollution-shifting ef-
fect, fifth term in Equation (48), when 1θ = . The intuition is the same as in 
Kennedy (1994): the pollution-shifting effect vanishes if pollution is per-
fectly transboundary because shifted pollution causes as much damage to 
the domestic environment as domestic pollution.  
4.5.3 Perfect competition as special case of monopolistic competition 
As a final step of our analysis, we study how the results presented in Propo-
sitions 4 through 6 change as the firms’ market power vanishes. When 
σ → ∞ , utility over varieties produced at home, ix , and varieties produced 
abroad, jx , degenerates to 
1 1
i j
N N N
i j N
X x x
∗+
= = +
= +∑ ∑ , 
in which case, the varieties are perfect substitutes for each other, that is, 
identical from a consumer’s perspective.  
Proposition 7: When the firms’ market power vanishes, the non-cooperative 
choice coincides with the cooperative choice if 0θ = . However, if 0θ > , na-
tional governments choose less strict tax rates than the federal government.  
Proof: First, by rearranging, we rewrite Equation (53) as 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
2 1 1 1 1
2 22 11
2 1 2 1
1 1 11 1Coop
t t t tv
tt
σ σ σ σ
σσψ ψ
α β σθ θ α β θσ
ψ σ η θη θ
− − − −
−−=
− − + − +∂ ⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟∂ −⎝ ⎠ + −+ −
. (56) 
Second, using L’Hôpital’s rule we establish that 
?
1
11 1
1lim lim lim lim 0
ln
t
tt t t
σ
σσ σσ σ σ σ
σ
σ σσ
σ
−
−− −→∞ →∞ →∞ →∞
→∞
∂
∂= = = =∂
∂
 since 1t > . 
Third, using the result that 1lim 0t σσ σ −→∞ = , we write the limit of Equation (56) 
as the elasticity of substitution between different varieties approaches infin-
ity as 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
0
2 1 1 1 1
2 22 11
1
11
2
2 1 2 1
lim lim
1 1 11 1
1 0
1
Coop
t t t tv
tt
θ
σ σ σ σ
σσ σ σψ ψ
α β σθ θ α β θσ
ψ σ η θη θ
α β θ
η θ
→ →
− − − −
−→∞ →∞ −=
→ →→
− − + − +∂ ⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟∂ −⎝ ⎠ + −+ −
−= − ≤+
?????????? ?????
??? ???????? , 
which is zero if 0θ =  and negative if 0θ > . In the former case, the national 
governments have no incentive to depart from the cooperative tax level. In 
the latter case, the national governments have an incentive to lower their 
tax rates from the cooperative level. □ 
For a federation of two symmetric states, Proposition 7 is equivalent to 
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. Thus, we obtain the results of our model 
with perfectly competitive firms as a special case of our model with monopo-
listically competitive firms. 
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5 Conclusions and policy implications 
In this section we summarise the main results, discuss policy implications 
and propose topics for future research. 
5.1 A summary of main results 
In accordance with the existing body of knowledge, Proposition 1 states that 
when the member states are small, firms perfectly competitive and pollution 
non-transboundary, the national governments’ choice of environmental 
standards coincide with that of the federal government’s. However, if the 
third assumption is relaxed, without cooperation, all states choose less strict 
standards than the federal government, even if pollution is only partially 
transboundary, as Proposition 2 states. Intuitively, this is because relaxing 
the third assumption introduces negative transboundary externalities, 
which the federal government internalises but national governments don’t. 
If we assume monopolistically instead of perfectly competitive firms, the re-
sult that non-cooperative regulations are federally efficient when pollution 
is non-transboundary holds no longer. Nonetheless, a priori, there is noth-
ing to suggest that environmental policy is less strict under non-cooperation 
than under cooperation. In the presence of both positive and negative trans-
boundary externalities, not-in-my-back-yard might occur as well. When pol-
lution is perfectly transboundary, the opportunity cost in terms of environ-
mental damages of undercutting the rival state’s tax rate becomes 
infinitesimally small. In that case, ecological dumping must occur, as 
Proposition 6 states. In this respect we arrive at the same conclusion as 
Rauscher (1995) in his location game with one monopolistic firm. 
64 
To summarise, if firms have market power and/or if pollution is trans-
boundary, the national governments are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma as 
the one illustrated in Figure 6. Joint welfare is maximised when both coun-
tries set emission taxes equal Coopψ . However, the Nash equilibrium is for 
both to set taxes either above or below Coopψ . To answer the question raised 
at the outset, we find no theoretical grounds for the environmentalists’ fear 
of ecological dumping in a federation where trade policy is banned, except in 
the case of perfectly transboundary pollution. 
       
  Country B    Country B 
  Coopψ<  Coopψ  Coopψ >     Coopψ<  Coopψ  Coopψ >  
Coopψ<  (15, 15) (30,10) (35, 5)  Coopψ<  (20, 20) (15, 30) (5, 35) 
Coopψ  (10, 30) (25, 25) (30, 15) or Coopψ  (30, 15) (25, 25) (10, 30) 
Co
un
tr
y 
A 
 
Coopψ >  (5, 35) (15, 30) (20, 20)  C
ou
nt
ry
 A
  
Coopψ >  (35, 5) (30, 10) (15, 15) 
 (ecological dumping)   (not-in-my-back-yard) 
Figure 6: Non-cooperative choice of emission taxes in a federation of two symmetric 
countries when firms have market power and/or pollution is transboundary. The 
numbers in the parenthesis express the payoff for country A and B, respectively.  
All in all, we contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we show that 
the existence of pollution that spills from one country into another works in 
favour of ecological dumping both in perfect and in monopolistic product 
market competition. Second, we show that for ecological dumping to occur, a 
priori, pollution must be perfectly transboundary if firms are monopolisti-
cally competitive, whereas it suffices that pollution is partially transbound-
ary if firms are perfectly competitive. Third, we show that perfect competi-
tion and the standard results associated with it, are obtained as a special 
case of monopolistic competition when the monopolistically competitive 
firms’ market power is eliminated. 
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5.2 Policy implications 
Since national governments do not, in general, choose federally efficient en-
vironmental standards when firms have market power and/or if pollution is 
transboundary, we propose that: 
Policy implication 1: Environmental standards should be set at the federal 
level if firms are less than perfectly competitive or if pollution spills from one 
state into another. 
However, this does not imply harmonisation of environmental regulations 
across states. On the contrary, for a group of countries as heterogeneous as 
e.g. the EU-25, the welfare maximising regulations, whether set as emission 
standards or emission taxes, are bound to differ. Figure 7 illustrates the 
welfare losses due to harmonisation of emission taxes in a federation of two 
asymmetric states.  
 
AMDC
BMDCCosts
AMAC
BMAC
ψˆ
Aψ ∗
Bψ ∗
Pollution per country Pollution per country
ψˆ
Aψ ∗
Bψ ∗
Costs
AMAC
BMAC
,A BMDC
(a) (b)  
Figure 7: Welfare loss due to harmonisation of emission taxes in a federation of two 
states (a) with different marginal damage costs (MDC) and marginal abatement 
costs (MAC) and (b) with same MDC but different MAC.  
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In case (a), the countries differ both in terms of how much damage a given 
amount of pollution causes and in terms of costs for reducing pollution. In 
case (b), marginal abatement costs (MAC) are as in case (a) but marginal 
damage costs (MDC) are same. Joint welfare is maximised when country A 
sets its emission tax equal Aψ ∗  and country B equal to Bψ ∗ . If a uniform tax 
rate, say ψˆ , was adapted instead of Aψ ∗  and Bψ ∗ , welfare would fall by an 
amount equal to the shaded areas in Figure 7 .  
As Baumol and Oates (1988, pp. 286-287)  suggest, there are a number of 
reasons why MDC and MAC schedules may vary across countries. MDC 
schedules, as depicted in Figure 7, are vertical sums of the per capita sched-
ules of willingness-to-pay to avoid environmental damages. Thus, the MDC 
schedule for a given country depends both on the number of consumers liv-
ing within its boundaries as well as on the tastes of individual consumers. 
MAC schedules, on the other hand, may vary with the industrial composi-
tion of a federation so that it may be significantly more costly for some coun-
tries to reduce emissions than others. Thus, we propose that: 
Policy implication 2: If cooperation means, for practical reasons, harmoni-
sation, cooperation may be undesirable even if national governments may 
misuse environmental standards to address non-environmental concerns. 
5.3 Suggestions for future research 
Even though we set out to study a federation of asymmetric member states, 
our model with monopolistically competitive firms assumes, for the sake of 
simplicity, a federation of two identical states. Future research should avoid 
this simplification and allow for asymmetry between states. To our knowl-
edge, as to date, only a few papers have studied regulatory competition be-
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tween asymmetric countries. One of them is Kanbur & Keen (1993). They 
show, in two-country economy, that differences in country size reinforce the 
inefficiencies of non-cooperative behaviour. 
Whereas we assume, in both models, that firms retain their mobility for zero 
cost even after they have located, the oligopoly models reviewed in Subsec-
tion 2.2.2, assume that initially, firms can locate for zero cost, but after that 
they face infinite relocations costs. A more natural modelling strategy would 
assume that firms face, at all times, relocation costs somewhere in between 
zero and infinity. 
Assuming that pollution is a public bad, even if appropriate for carbon diox-
ide and other greenhouse gases, limits the applicability of our analysis for 
pollutants, such as sulphur and nitrogen oxides, for which environmental 
damage is location dependent. Thus, future work should assume a more 
general relationship between emissions in one country and pollution of an-
other. For example, instead of using a single parameter, as we do, to capture 
the extent to which pollution is transboundary, a more general modelling 
strategy would employ a n n×  matrix, where n is the number of countries 
and the element ,i ja  the effect of one unit of emissions in country i on the 
level of pollution in country j, { }, 1,...,i j n∈ . The two extreme cases 0θ =  and 
1θ =  would be represented by an identity matrix and a matrix where , 1i ja =  
,i j∀ , respectively. For sulphur and nitrogen oxides, such matrices are al-
ready available within the monitoring initiatives of the UN’s Convention on 
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution. 
We have implicitly assumed that there is no difference in terms of efficiency 
between quantity-based and price-based policy instruments. However, as 
68 
has been discussed within the literature originating with Weitzman (1974), 
this may not be true if there is uncertainty about the costs of environmental 
damages or abatement efforts. Additionally, as Figure 7 suggests, under 
harmonisation, one type of instrument may yield smaller welfare losses 
than the other. Future research should take this into consideration. 
Future research should also take into consideration the possibility that the 
federal government is not as benevolent as we have assumed. For example, 
the European Commissioners, one from each member state, may represent 
national interest even if they are supposed to represent the interests of the 
EU as a whole.  
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 Appendix A: Marshallian demands for individual varieties 
In this appendix we derive the home and foreign consumer’s Marshallian 
demands for the differentiated goods. We start with proving that the utility 
function, 
11 1
1 1
N N N
g g
g g N
X x x
σ
σσ σ
σ σ
∗ −+− −
= = +
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ , (A1) 
introduced in Equation (19), has a constant Hicks elasticity of substitution 
between different varieties as claimed in Subsection 4.2. Total differentia-
tion of Equation (A1) yields 
1 2
1 2
... N N
N N
X X XdX dx dx dx
x x x ∗∗ ++
∂ ∂ ∂= + + +∂ ∂ ∂ . (A2) 
The marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between two varieties, say i  and j , 
is found by rearranging the total differential (A2), 
1
,
0
0g
j ji
i j
dXi idx
j
X
dx xxMRS Xdx x
x
σ
==
∂
⎛ ⎞∂= = − = −⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠∂
, 
where 0dX =  because utility is constant along an indifference curve, and 
0gdx =  for all { }1,...,g N N ∗∈ + , ,g i j≠ . Whereas ,i jMRS  is measured in 
units of variety j that a consumer is willing to give up for a unit of variety i, 
the elasticity of substitution, as defined by Hicks (1932), is a ratio and thus 
has no unit. 
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Formally, the Hicks elasticity of substitution is defined as the relative 
change in the ratio in which j and i are consumed due to a change in the cor-
responding marginal rate of substitution. For the utility function (A1) we 
find that 
( ) 1
,
1
, ,
,
/
/
j i jj j
j i i j ii i
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i j i i
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d x x xx x
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σ
σ
σ
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⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, 
which concludes our proof. Graphically, the Hicks elasticity of substitution 
can be interpreted as a measure of the curvature of the indifference curves 
(Varian 1992, p. 13). The indifference curves are straight lines if σ → ∞ , 
kinked if σ is zero. When σ → ∞ , the varieties are perfect substitutes, i.e. 
identical from a consumer’s perspective.  
Next, we turn to the Marshallian demands. The home consumer maximises 
Equation (A1) subject to the budget constraint 
1 1
N N N
s s s s
s s N
p x tp x y
∗+
= = +
+ =∑ ∑ , (A3) 
where ip  are prices charged by domestic producers, jp  prices charged by 
foreign producers and y total expenditure on the differentiated goods. 
Transport costs raise jp  by a factor of t. The Lagrangian for the home con-
sumer’s problem can be written as 
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⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞Γ ≡ + − + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ , (A4) 
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where λ  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. 
Partial differentiation of Equation (A4) with respect to sx  yields the first-
order conditions 
1 1
s s
s
X x p
x
σ σ λ−∂Γ = =∂   for all { }1,...,s N∈ , and (A5) 
1 1
s s
s
X x tp
x
σ σ λ−∂Γ = =∂  for all { }1,...,s N N N ∗∈ + + . (A6) 
Dividing each of the first-order conditions (A5) and (A6) by 
1 1
i iX x pσ σ λ− = , 
where { }1,...,i N∈ , yields 
i
s i
s
px x
x
σ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 for all { }1,...,s N∈  and 
i
s i
s
px x
tp
σ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 for all { }1,...,s N N N ∗∈ + + . 
Substituting these into the budget constraint (A3) yields 
( )11
1 1
N N N
i i s s
s s N
p x p tp yσσ σ
∗+ −−
= = +
⎛ ⎞+ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ . (A7) 
By rearranging Equation (A7) we obtain the home consumer’s Marshallian 
demands for domestically produced varieties as 
1
i ix yp P
σ σ− −=  where ( )
1
111
1 1
N N N
s s
s s N
P p tp
σσσ
∗ −+ −−
= = +
⎛ ⎞≡ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  (A8) 
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for all { }1,...,i N∈ . By a similar procedure, that is, by dividing Equation (A5) 
and Equation (A6) by 
1 1
j jX x tpσ σ λ− = , we obtain the domestic consumer’s 
Marshallian demands for imported varieties as 
( ) 1j jx y tp Pσ σ− −= , where P is defined as in Equation (A8), (A9) 
for all { }1,...,j N N N ∗∈ + + . By substituting the Marshallian demands (A8)
and (A9) for all varieties i and j into the direct utility function (A1), we can 
write the utility over the differentiated goods as  
yX
P
= , 
which tells us that utility over the differentiated goods is equal to total ex-
penditure on differentiated goods divided by 
( )
1
111
1 1
N N N
s s
s s N
P p tp
σσσ
∗ −+ −−
= = +
⎛ ⎞≡ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ . (A10) 
Thus, we can interpret P as the price of unit of utility over the differentiated 
goods for the home consumer. By symmetry, we can write the price of unit of 
utility over the differentiated goods for the foreign consumer as 
( )
1
11 1
1 1
N N N
s s
s s N
P tp p
σσ σ
∗ −+−∗ ∗ −
= = +
⎛ ⎞≡ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ , (A11) 
and the foreign consumer’s Marshallian demands as 
1
j jx y p P
σ σ∗ ∗ ∗− ∗ −=  for all { }1,...,j N N N ∗∈ + +  and 
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( ) 1i ix y tp Pσ σ−∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −=  for all { }1,...,i N∈ . (A12)
 Appendix B: Equilibrium number of firms 
In this appendix we solve for the equilibrium number of firms producing at 
home and abroad. Substituting the firms’ choice of prices (36) and (38) into 
the definitions of P and P  (A10) and (A11) yields  
( ) 11 111P Nc N tc σ σσσσ − −− ∗ ∗⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦−  and  (B1) 
( ) 11 111P N tc N c
σ σσσ
σ
− −∗ ∗ ∗ −⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦− . (B2) 
It follows from free market entry and exit that no firm makes a profit, or a 
loss for that matter, in the long-run. Thus, maximum profits (37) and (39) 
must equal zero in equilibrium, 
( )1 1 1 1 01c P t P R
σ
σ σ σα σ
σ σ
−
− − ∗ −⎛ ⎞ + − =⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠  and (B3) 
( )1 1 1 1 01c P t P R
σ
σ σ σα σ
σ σ
−∗
∗ − − −⎛ ⎞ + − =⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
.  (B4) 
Substituting the equilibrium values of P  and P ∗  from Equations (B1) and 
(B2) into Equations (B3) and (B4) we can write the zero-profit conditions as 
( )( ) ( )( )1 11 11 1 1 1Nc N tc t N tc N c c Rσ σσ σ σ σασ − −− −− ∗ ∗ − ∗ ∗ − −⎡ ⎤+ + + =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  and (B5) 
( )( ) ( )( ) 111 11 1 1 1N tc N c t Nc N tc Rσσσ σ σ σασ ∗ −−− −− ∗ ∗ − − − ∗ ∗⎡ ⎤+ + + =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ .
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Equating left-hand sides, and rearranging the resulting equation, yields 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 11 1
1 1 11
c tc c tc
N tc N cNc N tc
σ σσ σ
σ σ σσ
− −− ∗ ∗ −
− − ∗ ∗ −− ∗ ∗
− −= ++
.  (B6) 
Substituting N N∗ = Ω −  into (B6) yields  
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 11 1
1 1 1 1 11
c tc c tc
N tc c NcNc tc N tc
σ σσ σ
σ σ σ σ σσ
− −− ∗ ∗ −
− − − ∗ − ∗ −− ∗ ∗
− −= + Ω −+Ω −
.  (B7) 
To simplify notation, we denote  
1tc
c
σ
γ
−
∗
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  and 
1
tc
c
σ
γ
−∗
∗ ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, and rewrite Equation (B7) as 
1 1
N N N N
γ γ
γ γ γ
∗
∗ ∗
− −=+ Ω − + Ω − . (B8) 
By rearranging (B8), we can write the equilibrium number of firms produc-
ing at home as  
( )
( )( )
1 2
2 1 1
N
γ γγ
γ γ
∗ ∗
∗
Ω − += − − , (B9) 
and by substituting (B9) into N N∗ = Ω − , the equilibrium number of firms 
producing abroad as 
( )
( )( )
1 2
2 1 1
N
γ γγ
γ γ
∗
∗
∗
Ω − += − − . 
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We stop to note that ( )( ), , 1 1γ ψ γ ψε ε β σ∗ ∗= = − −  and that ,, , γ ψγ ψ γ ψε ε ε∗ ∗= = −  
since , , 1c cψ ψε ε β∗ ∗= = −  and , , 0c cψ ψε ε∗ ∗= = , based on Equations (33) and (34).  
Next, we derive the elasticity of N  and N ∗  with respect to ψ  and ψ ∗ . Dif-
ferentiating the natural logarithm of (B9) yields 
( )2 ln ln ln ln lnln
1 2 1 1
d d d d dd N
γ γ γγ γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γγ γ γ
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗
− + += + +− + − − , 
which can be rewritten, using the equilibrium condition c c ∗= , which trans-
lates into 1 Etγ γ ∗ −= = ,  as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2 2
2ln ln ln ln ln ln
11 1
d N d d d d dγ γ γγ γ γ γ γγγ γ
∗ ∗ ∗= − + + + +−− − . (B10) 
Dividing Equation (B10) by a relative change in ψ , we obtain 
( )
( )( )
( )
1
2 2, , 1
2 1 1ln 2
ln 1 1N
td N
d t
σ
ψ γ ψ σ
β σγε εψ γ ∗
−
−
− −= = − =− −
 (B11) 
By a similar procedure, that is, by dividing Equation (B10) by a relative 
change in ψ ∗  we obtain 
( )
( )( )
( )
1
,2 2, , 1
2 1 1ln 2
ln 1 1
NN
td N
d t
σ
ψψ γ ψ σ
β σγε ε εψ γ∗ ∗ ∗
−
∗ −
− −= = − = − = −− −
. 
The elasticises of the number of firms producing abroad follow by symmetry, 
,, NN ψψε ε∗ ∗ =  and 
,, , NN N ψψ ψε ε ε∗ ∗= = − . (B12)
 Appendix C: Equilibrium price of the dirty good 
In this appendix we solve for equilibrium price of the dirty at home and 
abroad. By differentiating the natural logarithm of Equation (B1) we can 
write a relative change in the price of the dirty good at home as 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
11
11
ln 1 ln ln 1 ln
ln
1
Nc d N d c N tc d N d c
d P
Nc N tc
σσ
σσ
σ σ
σ
−− ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
−− ∗ ∗
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − + + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤− +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, 
which can be rewritten, using the equilibrium conditions c c ∗=  and 
/ 2N N ∗= = Ω , as  
( ) ( )
( )( )
1 1
1
ln 1 ln ln 1 lnln
1 1
d N d c t d N t d c
d P
t
σ σ
σ
σ σ
σ
− ∗ − ∗
−
+ − + + −= − + . (C1) 
Dividing Equation (C1) by a relative change in ψ , we obtain the elasticity of 
P  with respect to the tax rate chosen by the home country, 
( )( )
1 1
, ,, ,
, 1 1
ln
ln 1 1 1
c Nc N
P
t td P
d t t
σ σ
ψ ψψ ψ
ψ σ σ
ε ε ε εε ψ σ
∗ ∗
− −
− −
+ += = ++ − + . (C2) 
By substituting , 0c ψε ∗ =  from Equation (34) and ,, NN ψψε ε∗ = −  from Equation 
(B12) we can rewrite Equation (C2) as 
( )( )
1
,, 1 ,1
1 1
1 1 1cP N
t
t t
σ
ψψ σ ψσε ε εσ
−
− −
−= ++ − + , (C3) 
where the first term represents the production-cost effect and the second the 
home-market effect, discussed in detail in Subsection 4.4. 
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By substituting , 0c ψε ∗ =  and ( )( ) ( )21 1, 2 1 1 / 1N t tσ σψε β σ − −= − − −  from Equa-
tions (33) and (B11), respectively, we can rewrite Equation (C3) as 
, 1
1
1P tψ σ
βε −−= −  
By a similar procedure, that is, by dividing Equation (C1) by a relative 
change in ψ ∗ , we obtain the elasticity of P  with respect to the tax rate cho-
sen by the foreign country, 
( )( )
( ) 11 1
1 1, , ,1
1ln 1
ln 1 11 1P c N
td P t t
d t tt
σσ σ
σ σψ ψ ψσ
βε ε εψ σ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
−− −
∗ − −−
−−= = − = −+ −− + . 
The elasticities of P ∗  with respect to ψ∗  and ψ  follow by symmetry, 
( )( )
1
1 1, , ,1
1 1 1
1 11 1P c N
t
t tt
σ
σ σψ ψ ψσ
βε ε εσ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
−
− −−
− −= + =+ −− +  and 
( )( )
( ) 11 1
,1 , 1, 1
11
1 11 1c NP
tt t
t tt
σσ σ
ψσ ψ σψ σ
βε ε εσ∗
−− −
− −−
−−= − = −+ −− + . 
 Appendix D: Derivation of Equation (53) 
In this appendix we solve for the value of /v ψ∂ ∂  in the cooperative equilib-
rium. Substituting ( )( )1 1 /Coopψ η θ σ σ= + −  and ( ) ( )2 1 / 1Coope α β η θ= − + Ω  
from Equations (50) and (51), respectively, into Equation (52) yields 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
1
, 1
1, , 1 2 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
Coop
N
v P m t
t
σ
ψ σ
ψ ψ
α β σ θ σ θεψ η θ σ σ θ θ
−
−
=
⎛ ⎞∂ − − − +⎜ ⎟= −⎜ ⎟∂ + − + + −⎝ ⎠
.  (D1) 
Substituting 
( )( )
( )
1
2, 1
2 1 1
1
E
N E
t
t
ψ
β σε
−
−
− −=
−
 from Equation (B11) into Equation (D1) yields  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
11
2 1 11
1, , 2 1 1 2 11
1 11 1Coop
E
E EE
v P m tt
t tt
σ
ψ ψ
σ θβ θ σα β
ψ ση θ
−−
− −−
=
⎛ ⎞∂ +− − −− ⎜ ⎟= −⎜ ⎟∂ − −+ − ⎝ ⎠
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